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1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous possible contexts can impel national governments to 
start reparations programs.  From the array of possibilities, this 
Article focuses on reparations for the effects of a crisis that ravaged 
a whole nation—for example civil war, genocide, dictatorship, or 
apartheid—rather than on one discrete, odious deviation from the 
norms of a functioning democracy.  Isolated incidents can generate 
urgent needs for repair, but the reparations under discussion in 
this Article presume a more fundamental ambition:  a declaration 
of the nation’s past as broken, and its future in need of mending.1  
The government of a nation, acknowledging grave strife in its 
 
* Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  My 
thanks to the New York Tort Theory Reading Group and the faculties of Emory, 
Washington University, and the Australian National University law schools for 
valuable comments on an earlier version of this Article.  My thinking on 
reparations and microfinance owes much to Hans Dieter Seibel, who also gave 
helpful comments.  A shorter version of this Article, published in THE GENDER OF 
REPARATIONS (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2009), benefited from the editorial attentions 
and leadership of Ruth Rubio-Marín, Pablo de Greiff, and Roger Duffie of the 
International Center for Transitional Justice.  I thank the ICTJ for its support. 
1 I remark on the problematic nature of “isolated incidents” in Anita 
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 499 &  
n.331 (1997).  This reservation noted, I mean to exclude for this purpose 
reparations contexts such as the internment of Japanese citizens in the United 
States during World War II, focusing instead on comprehensive national schemes 
undertaken in a context of economic development. 
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recent past, has committed itself to disbursing sums of money to 
large numbers of its people as part of its transition to a stable civil 
society. 
Precedents for this undertaking provide models for the 
subcategory of interest here, pecuniary reparations: that is, 
programs that seek to identify and compensate individual citizen-
claimants in recognition of human rights violations during the 
recent past.  Such recognition can take monetary form in transfer 
payments to individuals.  Among the countries that have been able 
to distribute pecuniary reparations following national crises are  
Argentina, which through legislation in 1994 appropriated 
reparations for victims of forced disappearances and detentions 
that took place from 1974 to 1983, paid in the form of bonds;2 Chile, 
which in 1992 appropriated pension funds for the victims of 
human rights violations that took place from 1973 to 1990;3 and 
South Africa, which disbursed cash payments totaling U.S. $5.5 
million to approximately 14,000 apartheid-era victims.4  In less 
wealthy nations, including Peru, Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and 
Guatemala, governments have approved the provision of 
monetary compensation to citizen-victims in the wake of their own 
national crises, suggesting that pecuniary reparations hold appeal 
as policy even in nations that are hard-pressed to finance a new 
round of transfer payments. 
When it opts for pecuniary reparations, a national government 
necessarily rejects various alternative stances.  It disagrees with 
any onlookers who would say that the endeavor of reparation is 
futile.  It does not believe that money in particular cannot affect 
meaningful reparation, and goes a step further by denying that 
payments to individuals waste more money compared to collective 
 
2 See María José Guembe, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights 
Violations: The Argentinean Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 21, 29–31 
(Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (discussing the passage of laws 
providing compensation to victims of human rights violations that occurred 
between 1974 and 1983 and the valuation of the compensation provided). 
3 See Elizabeth Lira, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile, 
in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 55, 83–85 (discussing the distribution of pensions 
funds to peasants excluded from agrarian reform or expelled from their land 
under the military regime). 
4 See Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa, 
in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 176, 188–89 (exploring the reparations debate in 
post-apartheid South Africa and outlining recommendations for reparations). 
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payments.5  Consistent with Pablo de Greiff’s panoramic chapter, 
“Justice and Reparations,”6 this government has implicitly deemed 
insufficient two significant constituents of transitional justice: non-
material reparations (such as an apology only)7 and disbursements 
that pursue a collective goal (such as economic development) that 
make individuals better off only indirectly.8 
Economic development hovers in the wings behind a 
reparations stage.  Because reparations programs are frequently 
established in contexts characterized by disarray and vulnerability, 
they likely coexist with fragile national economies, shaky financial 
institutions, uncertain or erratic regulation of these financial 
institutions and related commercial practices, patchy telephony, 
and general technological underdevelopment.  Significant physical 
danger might remain around the nation’s buildings, modes of 
transport, and public spaces.  Systemic human rights violations for 
which states have acknowledged responsibility are usually part of 
a larger devastation that did not leave the rule of law unaffected 
and had harmful effects on both the safety and protection of 
investment capital and the physical safety of civilian citizens.9 
 
5 See infra notes 24–25, 31, and accompanying text (discussing these debates 
over reparations fundamentals). 
6 See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 451 
(developing an understanding of reparations that can be applied to the resolution 
of “massive and systematic cases of abuse”). 
7 Pope John Paul II, for example, once proclaimed an apology for the injuries 
done to Africa by Christian Europe.  See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Pope Apologizes to Africans 
for Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1985, at A3 (reporting on speech to Cameroonian 
intellectuals in which Pope John Paul II asked for “pardon from our African 
brothers who suffered so much because of the trade in blacks”). 
8 After World War II, for example, Japan invested in the economies of Burma, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam pursuant to treaties whose names 
included the word “reparations.” 
9  See HANS DIETER SEIBEL, FROM RECIPIENTS OF REPARATION PAYMENTS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS: A STUDY OF THE POSSIBLE RELATIONS 
BETWEEN REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND MICROFINANCE 2 
(2003) (paper presented at The Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Study and 
Conference Center “Villa Serbelloni”) [hereinafter SEIBEL, REPARATIONS 
SHAREHOLDERS], available at http://www.uni-koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/08-2005/2003 
-6%20ICTJ%20Microfinance.pdf. 
In a total crisis, the state virtually ceases to exist, national economies 
disintegrate, and social and political structures melt away.  A significant 
number of people are exposed to a day-to-day struggle for survival, 
often separated from their homes and deprived of their usual sources of 
livelihood. In particular, total crisis means that national governmental 
and civil society organizations have been destroyed; the production and 
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A government certain of its plan to make transfer payments to 
victims could decide to wait for some marker of stability to arrive 
before forming its plan.  But the wait might be too long, especially 
for a government that wants to capitalize on some of the 
advantages of economic reparations.  If (contrary to rhetoric heard 
from some transitional governments), far from having to choose 
between reparations programs and development programs, a 
nation could design a reparations program in a way that 
simultaneously serves developmental goals, the advantages of 
moving swiftly forward become plain.  The prospect of achieving 
both reparation and development is realistic if one mode of 
pecuniary repair, “microcredit” or “microfinance,”10 is indeed as 
salutary as its many admirers believe. 
That individuals benefit from receiving money is axiomatic.  A 
financial institution that profits from such transactions with 
individuals will in turn regard itself as better off.  When enough 
people join this new expansion of the banking business, gains 
spread beyond parties to the deals. 
Many observers believe that gains rooted in small banking 
transactions change the world.  The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize went 
not to treaty-signers or war-renouncers but jointly to an economist 
and the high-yield bank he founded, which had about $564,000,000 
on deposit at the time of the award.11  “Lasting peace cannot be 
achieved unless large groups find ways to break out of poverty,” 
the Norwegian Nobel Committee said in its announcement of the 
prize.  “Micro-credit is one such means.  Development from below 
also serves to advance democracy and human rights.”  The 
Committee added that microcredit was “an important liberating 
 
market distribution of goods and services has been disrupted; 
institutional capacity for policy decision and planning at [the] national 
level has been eliminated or curtailed . . . [and] large numbers of 
individuals have been physically and socially displaced and were subject 
to traumatizing experiences of violence. 
Id. 
10 See infra Section 3.1.1 (providing working definitions of “microcredit” and 
“microfinance”). 
11 See Grameen Bank at a Glance, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php 
?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) 
(providing an introduction to the operations and ownership of the Grameen bank, 
which now has 2559 branches covering 84,691 villages). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1
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force in societies where women in particular have to struggle 
against repressive social and economic conditions.”12 
As scholars have established, the effort to achieve reparation 
following national crisis is at least hobbled, if not defeated, by 
conceptions of agency, identity, and recognition that take 
inadequate note of women’s experiences and consciousness.13  
Human rights, procedural rights, the law of war, acts of state, 
public discourse, dignity, distributive justice, and everything else 
that occupies the polity are all women’s issues as well.  They give 
rise to entitlements for both men and women, as individual citizens 
and stakeholders in the national collective. 
If reparations foster healing, then postponing reparations 
retards healing; thus, the healthier course would be to install a 
reparations scheme as soon as enough stability in the nation exists 
to make it possible.  The wait for wealth is too long.  When the 
familiar reparations conditions are present—a strife-torn past, an 
optimistic present, and a national economy battered or frail 
enough to need intervention—a program committed to the transfer 
of funds to individuals becomes better positioned to attain repair if 
it can transfer money in a way that would strengthen the emergent 
civil society.  Expenditures that merely put money in the hands of 
victims would be resisted, as dissenters within the government 
could invoke lack of resources, the existence of competing and 
legitimate reconstruction needs, and the divisiveness inherent in 
compensating only a few people. 
The political value of reparations money increases when 
reparations can augment national wealth as well as compensate 
victims for human rights abuses.  One might have thought that a 
reparations plan that transfers money must choose between (a) 
payments to repair past traumas or (b) investments in economic 
development, but not (a) and (b) both.  As this Article will try to 
demonstrate, however, a reparations plan need not necessarily 
 
12 See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 
2006 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes 
/peace/laureates/2006/press.html (claiming that microcredit would have to play 
a major part in any effort to alleviate poverty). 
13 The leading writer on this subject is the Spanish constitutional scholar Ruth 
Rubio-Marín.  See Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of Reparations: Setting the Agenda, 
in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN? GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 20 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2006); Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of 
Reparations in Transitional Societies, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING 
SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 63 (Ruth 
Rubio-Marín ed., 2009) [hereinafter Transitional Societies]. 
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relinquish either goal.  Through reparations, governments can 
simultaneously pursue pecuniary recompense to individuals and 
economic gain to the nation. 
The presence of entitlements amenable to monetary expression 
suggests that planners who make reparations policy ought to find 
guidance in principles of the law related to compensation for 
physical injury.  Injured persons have been presenting claims for 
pecuniary redress over millennia, in a range of contexts and legal 
systems.  The responses to their demands now form a transnational 
common discourse, such that it becomes plausible to regard 
pecuniary reparations as comparable to tort claims, no matter 
where the wrongs occurred or which legal system will adjudicate 
them.  Accordingly, this Article offers an approach to pecuniary 
reparations for human rights violations that draws support not 
only from feminism in general and the idea of microfinance as 
empowerment for women in particular, but also from tort theory. 
Anyone who proposes any form of pecuniary reparations, not 
just the microfinance variety advocated here, must first establish 
the rightness of paying money to individuals.  Section 2 defends 
economic compensation as a remedy for injured persons as 
reparative of a past national crisis.  Section 3 advocates 
microfinance in particular, in contrast to other (lesser) means of 
transferring payments to individual recipients. 
Readers who accept the argument for pecuniary redress made 
in Section 2, and the argument for microfinance as laid out in 
Section 3, move to the last step of the Article, which is to ask the 
woman question: how would reparations in the form of 
microfinance advance gender equality?  Section 4 provides an 
introduction to microfinance as constitutive of security and 
freedom.  We have already noted the Nobel Committee citation 
that took as axiomatic the power of “micro-credit” to improve the 
lives of poor women.14  Additional detail gathered in Section 5 
supports that view and establishes that the association between 
microfinance and gender equality becomes even stronger in the 
reparations context. 
 
 
 
 
14 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1
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2. ECONOMIC COMPENSATION FOR INDIVIDUALS POST-CRISIS 
THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW 
Reparations programs following national crises engage with 
and bear on the law in several distinct ways.  International law 
creates at least a basis if not a mandate for reparations that can take 
a pecuniary form.  Numerous legal instruments—the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment; the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
the American Convention on Human Rights; and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—declare a right to redress 
for human rights violations.15  Broadly understood, reparations 
constitute one form of such a legal remedy. 
The law is intertwined with every stage of the reparations 
process, from the early design of each program to its conclusion.  
Legislation creates reparations schemes.16  National laws decree 
what the government may do and which individuals will 
participate in processes.  Judges, advocates, and administrative 
lawyers play leadership roles in the implementation of reparations 
measures.  Even when laws and lawyers are absent from a 
particular locus of reparations, a discourse associated with law—
words like rights and justice—will likely be present, and 
reparations themselves serve as instruments to rebuild or install a 
rule of law. 
Although these iterations of law in reparations emphasize 
“public” law—especially international law, human rights law, and 
criminal law—the identification of individual victims also invokes 
a field of “private” law, the law of personal injuries.  Tort law 
provides for compensation to persons injured by wrongful 
conduct.  Within law, it contains its own jurisprudence—a 
 
15 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION [Australia], 
SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2000, ch. 5, available at http://www.humanrights.gov.ru 
/social-justice/sj-report/sjreport100/chap5.html (criticizing the Australian 
government for rejecting a formal national apology, refusing to consider monetary 
forms of compensation, and stating that citizen litigation is sufficient to achieve 
reparations). 
16 For Example, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, contains nearly three hundred 
pages of primary documents and legislation. 
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perspective on law-based responsibility that—while compatible 
with the public law governing states, crimes, and assertions of 
human rights violations—brings its own concerns to the 
assignment of entitlements and responsibilities.  This 
jurisprudence provides for torts-focused views on particular 
choices that face reparations planners. 
2.1. Compensation as a Constituent of Doing Justice 
International law recognizes a variety of means, going beyond 
money, to effect repair following violations of human rights.  In 
2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a report 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights declaring that 
reparations to or in respect of victims encompass “restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition.”17  The last two are particularly broad categories that 
include a range of measures: verification of facts and disclosure of 
truth, searches for corpses, public apologies, tributes to victims, 
civilian control of the military, an independent judiciary, and the 
installation of codes of conduct and ethical norms.18 
A torts perspective on reparations casts no slight on these 
ambitious ends by focusing on a discrete portion of them.  The 
torts vantage point shares Pablo de Greiff’s view that the word 
reparations “refer[s] to measures that provide benefits to victims 
directly.”19  It emphasizes compensation more than restitution, 
while acknowledging overlap between these two categories.20  
Most fundamentally, it emphasizes the need for money (or its 
equivalent) to change hands.  An entity accepting responsibility for 
past wrongs—usually a government—disburses money; victims or 
their heirs receive it. 
 
17 G.A. RES. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006). 
18 See id., ¶¶ 22–23 (detailing the measures that “satisfaction” and 
“guarantees of non-repetition” should include). 
19 de Greiff, supra note 6, at 453. 
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1979) (asserting that the first 
principle of tort actions is “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for 
harms”).  On the ranking of compensation ahead of restitution, see id., cmt. a 
(noting that tort law, unlike the law of unjust enrichment, does not focus on the 
benefit that the defendant received: “This first purpose of tort law leads to 
compensatory damages.”).  See also John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort 
Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006) (parsing 
distinctions between compensation and indemnification, which parallel 
distinctions between full and fair compensation). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1
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The monetary nexus is integral to torts.  In its use of the term 
“damages” for “the monetary award for legally recognized 
harm,”21 tort law aspires to integrate wrongs and rights through 
the disbursement and receipt of money.  This implicit unity 
appears more explicitly in the American compendium Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which defines damages as “a sum of money 
awarded to a person injured by the tort of another.”22  The 
Restatement declares that money is awarded to vindicate the ideals 
of tort law generally: 
The rules for determining the measure of damages in tort 
are based upon the purposes for which actions of tort are 
maintainable.  These purposes are: 
(a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for 
harms; 
(b) to determine rights; 
(c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and 
(d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and 
unlawful self-help.23 
In contrast to this claim of reparative ambition and possibility, 
several writers have singled out monetary compensation as 
uniquely problematic among possible means of reparation 
following a national crisis.  Taking the perspective of a victim, they 
question the reparative effect of receiving cash from a distant 
government.24  Taking the perspective of a payer-planner or 
 
21 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1047 (2000) (explaining that restitution 
and injunction are distinct from damages). 
22  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 (1979). 
23 Id. § 901. 
24 Women are prominent among the money-skeptics.  See, e.g., Roman David 
& Susanne Choi Yuk-Ping, Victims on Transitional Justice: Lessons from the 
Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 392, 403 
(2005) (noting that some mothers of disappeared sons in Argentina refused 
financial compensation on the ground that it would “diminish their claims for 
truth and justice”); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 103 (1998) 
(arguing with respect to reparations paid to survivors of Japanese-American 
internment that “reparations fall short of repairing victims or social relationships 
after violence” and questioning whether compensation is the most obvious need 
of victims); id. at 110 (“Social and religious meanings rather than economic values 
lie at the heart of reparations”); Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A 
Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining the September 11th 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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observer, they doubt that disbursements to individuals constitute a 
priority for a nation as it emerges from chaos and crisis.25 
A torts-centered response to these criticisms would insist that 
while money is indeed never sufficient to repair serious violations 
of human rights, it is still necessary.  Truth commissions, 
apologies, forward-looking rhetoric, newly-elected democratic 
governments committed to change, and other non-pecuniary 
measures are crucial to the rebuilding of societies in transition.  
Nevertheless, the currency of torts redress is literally found in 
currency.  Moreover, because human rights violations trammel on 
persons as individuals, the currency of reparations must go to 
them directly and personally.  Collective payments and programs, 
though undoubtedly salubrious, do not discharge this obligation. 
Torts perspectives focus on a crucial half of a balance that 
might otherwise be overlooked.  According to de Greiff, 
reparations payments without truth-telling can look like “‘blood 
money’” to victims, whereas without payments, truth-telling can 
look like “cheap talk.”26  Truth-telling ceases to be cheap talk when 
it includes the receipt and the disbursement of reparations monies.  
The value of receipt is at one level obvious—for most people, to 
have more money is better than to have less.  The rare recipient 
who disagrees, and deems money odious, is free to repudiate or 
give away her payment.27 
Disbursement yields its own benefits to the society and its 
government.  Instrumentalists may note that by declaring a 
financial obligation that a successor regime owes to victims, these 
payments open the possibility of deterrence.  Even though primary 
wrongdoers are likely unavailable to share in the obligation, a 
 
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 361 (2003) (emphasizing that 
from a victim’s point of view, monetary compensation can never be adequate and 
“moral accountability” is key for satisfactory compensation). 
25 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 24, at 73 (explaining that even though South 
Africa’s TRC employs a “public process of acknowledgment” of atrocities, 
psychological assistance and therapy may also be useful); see also Maryam Kamali, 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in 
East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 89, 129 n.173 (2001) 
(describing how countries that cannot afford to pay large sums of monetary 
reparations may supplement compensation with counseling and therapy in order 
to foster individual healing). 
26 See de Greiff, supra note 6, at 461 (explaining the complex means by which 
reparations complement other processes that occur in transitional justice). 
27 Exploring another level, I will presently take up the question of how to 
refine the payment of money to enhance its gains.  See infra Section 4. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1
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pecuniary program of reparations establishes ledgers that can be 
used in the future if wrongdoer-controlled assets become 
accessible.  Since technological innovation has made recordkeeping 
cheaper and hidden wealth easier to uncover, the establishment of 
these ledgers declares that a government not only has the 
machinery but also the will to find, catalogue, and reallocate the 
wealth that human rights violators wrongly hold.  For non-
instrumentalists and instrumentalists alike, ledgers affirm an ideal 
of governmental responsibility not only to apologize and tell the 
truth, but also to pay for misdeeds as measured in wrongs and 
rights.  The endeavor of determining a monetary amount to be 
paid, both in the aggregate and to each recipient, makes the reality 
of past wrongs concrete and visible even before any funds are 
transferred.28 
2.2. Not Just Money: Torts as Recognition 
We have noted the dichotomy that casts the phrase “blood 
money” as descriptive of monetary compensation that excludes 
truth-telling, and “cheap talk” as the complementary dismissive 
phrase for the inverse phenomenon.  Monetary compensation and 
truth-telling in this view are incomplete halves, each needing the 
other to forestall a well-earned pejorative and effect real 
reparation.  How can the two come together?  The annals of 
reparations present several possibilities, to which the tort-focused 
approach of this Article adds its own perspective.  For this 
purpose, tort law emphatically does not reduce to the payment of 
damages.  It concerns itself at least as much with the agency of the 
victim and the generation of recognition for an affront. 
Mere compensation has never accounted for all of what tort 
law and policy seek to accomplish.  Any law-based scheme that 
purports to compensate without recognition of the individual 
behind a claim—a person who holds rights and freedoms—is 
abjuring torts for something else.29  Tort law endeavors to speak for 
 
28 Cf. Christian Sundquist, Critical Praxis, Spirit Healing, and Community 
Activism: Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 659, 697 (2003) (arguing that reparations for African-Americans ought to take 
pecuniary form in order to highlight the economic privileges of white Americans, 
to “foster community activism,” and to emphasize the need among recipients for 
economic self-sufficiency). 
29 See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY 
LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 
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victims by supporting them as they speak for themselves.  
Complaint-initiated engagement of the legal system is a hallmark 
of tort, and has the capacity to alter the status quo before the 
government takes any initiative.30 
This pride of torts notwithstanding, reparations planners start 
their work familiar with the protest that the central tort equation—
approximately, wrongs equals damages equals money—does not 
align with injury as victims have experienced it.  In her comparison 
of pecuniary versus non-pecuniary reparations schemes, Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza relates a useful survey of recipients in Latin America 
and South America.  Though she is sympathetic to both types of 
reparations, Roht-Arriaza reports that victims value non-pecuniary 
measures much more than cash: 
Over and over again, in interviews and in interactions with 
therapists, victims ask for official and societal 
acknowledgment that they were wronged, restoration of 
their good name, knowledge of who and how it was done, 
and justice and moral reparations.  Victims are much more 
ambivalent about monetary reparations.  On the one hand, 
a number of victims and organizations of family members 
refused all money as “blood money” intended to silence 
them and to deflect attention from the larger issues of 
impunity and societal recognition.  On the other, some 
victims saw material reparations as just recognition by the 
state of the harm caused, money that would otherwise go to 
the state.  All agreed that compensation was never enough, 
or even the most important thing.31 
When asked why a reparations plan should spend scarce 
resources on a measure that recipients have declared would not by 
itself satisfy them, a defender of torts perspectives on reparations 
may need to say more than pecunia non olet.32  This defender can 
 
(1989) (discussing alternative routes to the ends associated with torts, especially 
compensation and deterrence). 
30 See generally Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37 (2000) 
(arguing that complaints initiate the process of individual healing as well as 
encourage societal improvements). 
31 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 180–81 (2004). 
32 Latin: Cash will be welcomed by those who receive it; “money has no 
odor.” 
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point out that a tort approach does not reduce reparations to cash 
transfers. 
An article from a bygone era is instructive on this point.  
Maurice Rosenberg, a civil procedure scholar, once contended that 
government had a role to play as a facilitator and supporter of 
personal injury claims.33  The notion sounds jarring today, at least 
in the United States.34  Nevertheless, in 1971 Rosenberg envisioned 
government intervention to assert the interests of injured citizens.  
He proposed a new ministry named the Department of Economic 
Justice that would pay out cash in response to reports of injury.35  
This utopian department would have the power to go after the 
wrongdoers it identified as responsible, taking “legal action 
appropriate to the situation—including wholesale (and hence, 
economically worthwhile) suits to recover amounts it had already 
paid out administratively, along with costs, interest, and other 
economic sanctions.”36 
Anyone inclined to deem this suggestion a naïve, idle dream 
about benevolence in support of injury claims of other people 
should remember that the principle of vicarious liability is heeded 
in daily practice around the developed world.37  All agree that an 
entity that did not participate directly or personally in wrongdoing 
may nevertheless be required, without any finding of its own fault, 
to compensate victims who suffered at the hands of individual 
wrongdoers.  The best-known example of vicarious liability is 
respondeat superior, a form of strict liability that is prevalent 
worldwide.  In the United States, business entities can also take on 
 
33 See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote 
Justice that is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971) (discussing the role of courts 
and judicial administration and the need for improvement in the system’s ability 
to root out evil and effect “good” procedures). 
34 In contemporary American debates, liberals defend tort law as it is 
currently practiced and associate proposals to reform it with business interests.  
See Stephen D. Sugarman, Ideological Flip-Flop: American Liberals are Now the 
Primary Supporters of Tort Law 13 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper, Paper 
No. 925244, Jan. 17, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=925244 (explaining that the main supporters of the fault-based torts 
system in the United States are on the left side of the political spectrum). 
35 See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 813–14 (suggesting an example of a 
departure from the more adversarial methods of seeking reparations). 
36  Id. at 814. 
37 Thanks to Mark Geistfeld, for clarifying this point, and to John Owen 
Haley for his insights into the relation between subrogation and torts-thinking 
about reparations, which inform these paragraphs. 
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vicarious liability by succession.  They might, through the 
purchase of corporate assets, gain ownership of a business’s 
liabilities, as well.38  After being compelled to pay damages 
pursuant to vicarious liability, an entity has the prerogative to seek 
indemnification from the person responsible for having committed 
the more fundamental, primary wrong.39  In this light, it becomes 
plausible to envision a unit within a national government 
(probably not named the Department of Economic Justice) taking 
on the role of a successor government, empowered to recoup 
national assets that have been plundered by notorious wrongdoers. 
Disgraced and culpable individuals may have lost their power 
to inflict harm on their fellow citizens, but they may own property 
sufficient to pay for some of their past harms.  For example, the 
rumor that Augusto Pinochet had stashed nine tons of gold in a 
Hong Kong bank vault proved to be untrue, but the estimate of $28 
million deposited in foreign accounts was well founded.40  This 
sum could have made an impact on Chile’s reparations program.41  
One human rights group has tried to force a reckoning of the gains 
amassed by the multinational corporations that supported the 
apartheid regime while doing business in South Africa the subject 
of another reparations program.42  Haile Mengistu Meriam, under 
 
38 See generally Symposium, Multinational Corporations and Cross Border 
Conflicts: Nationality, Veil Piercing, and Successor Liability, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 221 
(1995) (discussing divergence between U.S. and U.K. law on the issue of successor 
liability and how the notion of successor liability is more developed in the United 
States). 
39 The common law entitles an entity defendant to recover against an 
individual wrongdoer for monies that the entity paid to a third party as 
compensation for physical injuries.  See Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co., 
[1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.) (U.K.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (discussing how an 
employer who is required to pay damages after being found liable may seek 
indemnification from his employee); Saranillo v. Silva, 889 P.2d 685, 697 (Haw. 
1995) (explaining that employers who are found liable under respondeat superior 
may receive indemnification from their employees); Jackson v. Associated Dry 
Goods Corp., 192 N.E.2d 167, 169 (N.Y. 1963) (“It is well established that the 
culpability of the party seeking indemnity determines whether recovery over will 
be permitted.”) (citation omitted). 
40 Eva Vergara & Patrick J. McDonnell, No Pinochet Gold Hoard, Bank Says, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at A7. 
41 See Lira, supra note 3, at 56, 59. 
42 See Colvin, supra note 4, at 199. 
Jubilee South Africa has also pointed out that the multinational 
corporations that helped to finance the apartheid government in its final, 
most repressive years removed roughly R3 billion (US $375,000,000) a 
year between 1985 and 1993 from the country.  Jubilee argues that if 1.5 
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whose rule an estimated half a million civilians were killed in 
Ethiopia, including political dissidents killed by his military junta 
in the 1970s, took up residence in Zimbabwe and enjoyed access to 
“a free apartment and a fleet of luxury cars” that could have been 
liquidated to pay reparations to victims’ families.43  Too poor to 
effect its limited reparations scheme that had budgeted about 
$3,500,000,44 Haiti could certainly use some of the money that the 
Duvalier family embezzled before fleeing, even if the astounding 
estimate of “up to US $900 million”45 overstates what they stole. 
In this torts-influenced reckoning, victims of human rights 
violations would assert their claims and receive reparations 
payments from governments to compensate for discrete 
wrongdoings, with human malefactors in mind, but not in a 
bloodless shuffle of papers.  The government would accept 
responsibility on its own behalf—either for having done wrong 
itself or for not having fulfilled its duty to protect citizens from 
active wrongdoers46—and also as a quasi-insurer making 
payments for the wrongs of others, pursuant to its obligation.  It 
would pay reparations to citizen-victims without condescension, 
valuing its right of indemnification against the persons and entities 
that bear primary responsibility for the harm. 
Conveying payments for wrongful violations of human agency 
would thus signal not only an acknowledgment of responsibility 
 
percent of these profits was returned each year for six years, financial 
reparations at the level of the original TRC recommendations could be 
paid.   
Id.  Jubilee also supported a lawsuit in the United States against several of these 
corporations, arguing that they violated international law by exploiting cheap 
labor and collaborating with armed enforcers of the apartheid government.  In re 
South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(dismissing the action on the ground that plaintiffs did not demonstrate a 
violation of international law). 
43 Victor T. LeVine, Taylor Case Only a Start: Leaders Seldom Answer for Abuses, 
but that May Be Changing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2006, at B4. 
44 One commentator does not attribute Haiti’s failure to implement a 
program simply to its scarcity of resources, but concludes that the nation’s 
poverty played an undisputed role.  Alexander Segovia, The Reparations Proposals 
of the Truth Commissions in El Salvador and Haiti: A History of Noncompliance, in 
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 154, 164 (finding that other factors include the lack of 
importance given to reparations by the different players in the domestic, national, 
and international community). 
45 Paul Hamel, Preventing Democracy in Haiti: Turning the Light Off at the End of 
the Tunnel, PEACE MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2005, at 14. 
46 Rubio-Marín, Transitional Societies, supra note 13, at 77. 
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but a tacit pledge to pursue—or at least care about—the 
reclamation of this money from the primary offenders.  The tacit 
pledge, implying that the giver values its payment, expresses 
recognition of a particular historical event and the claim of right 
that derives from a wrong.  When the primary offenders gained the 
holdings in question through theft, extortion, or wrongful seizure, 
the retrieval effort also links the pathology of rights violation with 
the pathology of plundering a nation’s wealth—a connection that 
stands up for fiscal law and order along with human rights, and 
thus could enhance the reparations program in the eyes of foreign 
investors. 
Such recognition, with or without a public relations boost, has 
more force than a bland “mistakes-were-made handout” and 
acceptance of responsibility with no specific referents.  Lacking any 
consciousness of opportunity cost, payment devoid of any implicit 
reference to indemnification sounds like “cheap talk”—only 
slightly less cheap than talk accompanied by no money at all.  In 
the reparations setting of rights and wrongs, payment ought to 
come across as both compensation and fulfillment of a debt.  The 
money is not laundered, one might say.  Victims could accept it 
with honor.47 
2.3. Honoring Both (and Mediating Between) Security and Freedom 
Through Pecuniary Reparations 
Reparations planners who have decided to pay monetary 
compensation to victims might consider the purposes of transfer 
payments that are made as compensation for injury in ordinary 
litigation.  Following the lead of Ruth Rubio-Marín and Margaret 
Walker, who have urged attention to human rights violations,48 I 
 
47 One activist lawyer pursuing human rights claims was irked by his 
compatriots’ interest in the rumors of Pinochet’s gold in Hong Kong:  “It speaks 
badly of us Chileans that we react more strongly when we read a story about 
Pinochet and money, Pinochet and dollars, than when it is about Pinochet and 
deaths.”  Vergara & McDonnell, supra note 40, at A7.  Citizens of this very country 
who received “dollars” for events of the Pinochet-era nevertheless told 
researchers that money did not fulfill their needs for reparation.  Roht-Arriaza, 
supra note 31, at 180.  This apparent inconsistency becomes consistent when one 
recognizes that tort law’s preoccupation with money as damages is not merely 
pecuniary and nothing more.  Money changes hands to achieve fairness.  The 
Chilean reaction to news of money was indeed also a reaction to news of deaths. 
48 Rubio-Marín, Transitional Societies, supra note 13, at 95–96 (advocating 
attention to reasons and rationales behind human rights as a way to pursue 
gender equity); Margaret Urban Walker, Gender and Violence in Focus: A 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1
 
2009  PECUNIARY REPARATIONS AFTER NAT’L CRISIS 17 
argue here for a commensurate concern with what financial 
recompense seeks to accomplish.  The ends of tort law are security 
and freedom, pursued in balance. 
Tort-thinking desires security and freedom for both sides of the 
litigation caption.  A tort claim by a plaintiff complains of an 
invasion that may be seen as a breach of security; but defendants, 
for their part, are entitled to shelter from the danger of an arbitrary 
official conclusion that they caused injuries for which they now 
must pay.  For defendants, security takes form in procedural 
justice.  Tortious conduct impinges on the freedom of persons hurt 
by it.  At the same time, too much tort liability—condemnation out 
of proportion to the magnitude of real injuries and risks—unduly 
impinges on freedom of action. 
Divergent perspectives on torts share these two priorities even 
while unaligned on other questions.  For example, “security” 
speaks as pertinently to various problems of economic efficiency in 
torts as it does to corrective justice’s attention to the nature of the 
wrong that a victim suffered;49 human freedom is as integral to the 
jurisprudential concept of “fairness” as it is to the prerogative to 
engage in profitable activity that occupies the center of “welfare;”50 
thus the paired ends of “compensation” and “deterrence” mediate 
between security and freedom while honoring them both.51 
 
 
 
Background for Gender Justice in Reparations, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: 
UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 18, 
52 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2009) (noting that what appears to be one trauma can 
expand into a multiplicity of injuries). 
49 Examples abound.  Insecurity as a transaction cost impedes bargaining; the 
right to hold property is integral to participation in civil liability system as well as 
to one’s status as an economic actor; threats to physical security absent tort 
liability would be guarded against by wasteful precautions. 
50 Notwithstanding the contention in one widely cited work that fairness and 
welfare are opposites.  LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS 
WELFARE (2002). 
51 In principle, deterrence can be severed from compensation as long as a 
system forces actors to internalize the costs of their activities by some other 
means, like fines; but welfare analysts prefer to empower compensation-seeking 
victims as enforcers of this obligation, at least in settings like the United States 
where these alternative sources of cost internalization are weak.  See generally 
Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137 (1995) (noting the 
need for tort liability, not just administrative regulation, to force cost integration 
through deterrence in the context of managing new technologies).  See also infra 
note 142 and accompanying text. 
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2.3.1. Enhancing Security 
Although security applies to both sides of the litigation caption, 
it functions in a more fundamental way on the plaintiff’s side.  
After a procedure that is faithful to the rule of law deems a 
defendant responsible for an injury, security in tort law addresses 
mainly the safety or settled equilibrium that these defendants have 
disturbed.  Any national scale repair of this disruption must 
consider that a   wrongfully inflicted injury is a breach of the peace 
whose consequences extend into a victim’s future. 
In this reparations context, consider violence that government 
agents initiated or condoned, resulting in post-traumatic stress 
disorder and related anxieties.  Tort-thinking reminds 
policymakers that the repair of this injury cannot succeed without 
acknowledging its future effects.  Every wrong amenable to legal 
redress, not just trauma, projects forward in time.  Some of the 
protrusion into the future may be juridical rather than inherent in 
the wrong itself—that is, they may be kept alive by the preparation 
of testimony, the stoking of narration in public venues (such as 
truth commissions), or the tendency of adjudication to look 
backward—but victims feel its effects all the same.  Inflictors of 
injury know, or should know, that the wrong they commit will 
undermine a victim’s security even after they stop acting. 
The reparations programs of several nations have recognized 
this unity between past and future by not requiring victims to 
recount acute episodes that undermined their security abruptly.  A 
mother who inferred after some weeks of absence that her son 
disappeared, for instance, cannot identify an exact moment that 
her injury occurred, but has suffered a breach of her security.  
National reparations programs confront a cruel past havoc.  This 
disarray once threatened even business-like conceptions of 
security, such as the “rational” worries about investment that 
permeated the economies of Argentina and Chile.  Reparations 
presume, in short, that the breach of security is still alive, unsettled, 
voracious—a blight on the future and the present as well as the 
national past. 
Applied to ordinary civil justice in developed legal systems, 
where prosperous and well-represented defendants litigate by 
making arguments and shuffling papers, and where those 
“persons” who seek redress need not be human beings, rhetoric 
this vivid may sound a bit overheated. But even in the driest 
precincts, a quest for monetary compensation in court for non-
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contractual wrongs necessarily involves a violation of security; at 
the same time, the resistance that a defendant mounts is a plea to 
keep the tranquility of the status quo, casting the plaintiff as a 
disruptor.  Private-law adjudication sets out to determine in binary 
fashion which of the two is the troublemaker, the putative 
wrongdoer or the complainant.52  And then, if the plaintiff wins, 
the adjudicator fashions a remedy to restore equanimity and civil 
peace.53  Part of the work of recompense is to give the victim more 
security in the future.  Money damages paradigmatically do this 
job by allowing victims to collect their awards, put them in the 
bank, and sleep better. 
2.3.2. Enhancing Freedom 
Perpetrators of wrongdoing obligated under tort law to pay 
victims recompense—in contemporary practice, such perpetrators 
could be nation-states or business entities, not just individuals—
have overindulged in their own freedom, hurting other people at 
least along the way, if not on purpose.  Their freedom to swing 
their fist, or to not care about the foreseeable consequences of their 
inattention, or recklessly to neglect the basic safety of their 
citizenry, should have ended before the other person was hurt, but 
did not.  They felt free to cross a boundary.  They were wrong.  
“Our autonomy is limited,” writes torts scholar and philosopher 
Jules Coleman, “only insofar as we are not free to cross the borders 
that define the protective moral spheres of our neighbors.  
Boundary crossings are violations, and should harm ensue, 
compensation is owed.”54  Whether taking a trivial form, like an 
automobile collision that bends fenders, or a deep one, like a 
 
52 See Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 52 (2001) (examining this proposition through “[i]nversions of 
aggression” in civil rights litigation). 
53 Even in an idealized version of this restoration, nominal winners often fail 
to get what they really want.  See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 617–23 (2006) (noting the difficulty of collecting 
judgments).  American tort plaintiffs, for instance, often seek medical monitoring 
following the exposure to toxic substances, but almost never receive it.  Anita 
Bernstein, Fellow-Feeling and Gender in the Law of Personal Injury, 17 J. L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2009).  The focus of law (as contrasted to “equity”) on monetary 
damages forecloses creative remedies.  
54 Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2615 (1995); see 
also Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for 
Evaluating Intoxicated Consent, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 57, 61-62 (2009) (evaluating 
“boundary crossing” within the context of intoxicated consent under rape laws). 
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massacre, every wrongfully inflicted injury calls out for repair of 
what it inflicted on its victim.  Too much prerogative on the part of 
the wrongdoer—insufficiently checked and inhibited—has violated 
the rights of a human being. 
Pecuniary recompense for wrongdoing reminds the recipient 
that freedom exists not only for the class of assailants who 
overindulged but for the individual victim too.  Consequently, 
after legal proceedings have concluded, the recipient will 
ordinarily enjoy more choice than before.  If a monetary transfer 
succeeds in enhancing security for victims, then that increase in 
security will foster the victims’ sense of power over their 
environment.  Receiving money adds a layer of freedom to this 
minimum where the best revenge, so to speak, is not actual 
vengeance against perpetrators55 nor withdrawal from civil society, 
but a superior exercise of one’s human prerogatives.  Victims can 
now do what they want in a way that, unlike the actions of the 
wrongdoer, does not violate the rights of anyone else. 
Again, money makes for a uniquely effective instrument.  
Tortfeasors found liable in the legal systems of developed nations 
do not turn over a new appliance or a fancier wheelchair to you 
after you have established yourself as their victim.  They cut you a 
check, which allows you to spend your “reparations” as you like.  
Measures of compensation that reparations programs might use 
should also foster choice, and thus freedom. 
3. MICROFINANCE AS A DEVICE FOR REPARATIONS 
Reparations planners willing to consider the medium of 
pecuniary compensation face the question of which means of 
payment to use.  This Section outlines a proposal to convey 
payment in the form of shares in a microfinance institution.  To 
assess and defend the suggestion, this section begins by discussing 
“microfinance” in contradistinction to the more familiar term 
“microcredit.”  It next explores alternative structures for 
microfinance programs, and considers what microfinance has to 
offer that simple cash transfer payments do not.  Later parts of the 
Article build on this discussion by linking microfinance with the 
normative ambitions of tort theory and the enhancement of gender 
equality. 
 
55 Recall the American declaration that damages are awarded “to vindicate 
parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful self-help.”  See supra note 23 
and accompanying text. 
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3.1. Nomenclature:  “Microfinance” 
Coinage of the neologisms “microcredit” and “microfinance” 
added a contemporary gloss to ancient practices because small-
time financial transactions are as old as commerce itself.  Lack of 
clarity about what “microcredit” means in particular has sown 
confusion.56  Today, decades after its entrée into development 
discourse in the mid-1970s, “microcredit” might refer to many 
kinds of small-time lending and borrowing, including “agricultural 
credit, or rural credit, or cooperative credit, or consumer credit, 
credit from the savings and loan associations, or from credit 
unions, or from money lenders.”57  The younger word 
“microfinance” was coined by the German development scholar 
Hans Dieter Seibel in 1990.58  
3.1.1.  What is the difference between microfinance and 
microcredit? 
Microcredit is a small amount of money loaned to a client by a 
bank or other institution.  Microfinance refers to loans, savings, 
insurance, transfer services, microcredit loans and other financial 
products targeted at low-income clients.59 
Respecting the distinction between these two terms, this 
Section examines the virtues and limitations of distributing 
 
56 “[T]he word has been imputed to mean everything to everybody,” wrote 
Muhammad Yunus, the banking pioneer who went on to Nobel acclaim, “[w]e 
really don’t know who is talking about what.”  Grameen Bank, What is 
Microcredit?, Sept. 2009, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com 
_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=108. 
57 Id. 
58 Hans Dieter Seibel, Does History Matter? The Old and the New World of 
Microfinance in Europe and Asia, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1 (presented at the Asia Research 
Institute, National University of Singapore), available at http://www.uni-
koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/10-2005/2005-10%20The%20Old%20and%20the%20New 
%20World%20in %20Europe%20and%20Asia.pdf. 
59 See International Year of Microcredit 2005, Why a Year?—About Microfinance 
and Microcredit, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/pages/whyayear/whyayear 
_aboutmicrofinance.asp (last  visited Oct. 26, 2009).  The definition reserves “low-
income clients” for microfinance only, leaving open the possibility that high-
income clients might partake of microcredit.  In common parlance, however, they 
do not because high-income borrowers do not need small loans.  See also 
MicroCapital Institute, The Social Impact of Commercial Microfinance, at 4, 
http://microcapital.org/downloads/whitepapers/Social.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 
2009) (noting that loan size “can be used as a proxy for the social aspects of 
microfinance”). 
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reparations benefits as microfinance, giving beneficiaries new 
opportunities for savings and credit rather than loans.60 
The appeal to microfinance instruments rather than microcredit 
keeps faith with a crucial characteristic of reparations:  as complete 
or perfect transfers, they come with no obligation to be returned.  
Loans, credits, and exhortations to the poor to cultivate their inner 
entrepreneur are different from the transfer of wealth.  Identified 
victims of serious human rights violations hold no responsibility 
for earning and paying for their own reparations.61 
3.2. Choosing Among Means to Convey Pecuniary Reparations 
Through Microfinance 
Continuing the theme of going beyond credit to include an 
array of financial activities derived from work by development 
economist Hans Dieter Seibel and others, would establish 
recipients of reparations payments as shareholders in microfinance 
institutions.  The transfer payments from government to citizen-
victims would take the form of shares.  For this purpose, a 
microfinance institution is an entity that provides financial 
services—at least credit and savings, possibly others—to customers 
who would normally be considered too poor for a bank to profit 
from serving them.62 
Microfinance institutions can be, in Seibel’s tripartite scheme, 
either “formal,” “semiformal,” or “informal.”  The first category of 
“formal” institutions includes, or resembles, banking in the 
developed world: an institution (typically a bank or finance 
company) functions under regulation and supervision by a 
governmental authority.  “Semiformal” institutions are registered 
but not regulated as financial entities.  These institutions include 
savings and loan cooperatives and nongovernmental organizations 
 
60 This Section sweeps past an extensive, bitter political battle over the two 
words.  The United Nations “year,” for instance, is of microcredit rather than 
microfinance, despite lobbying for “microfinance” by nongovernmental 
organizations.  Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, 
at 62, 67.  For a victory of “microfinance” over “microcredit,” see Stephanie Strom, 
What’s Wrong with Profit?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at F1 (noting that the $ 100 
million donation of Pierre Omidyar to Tufts University was earmarked for 
“developing microfinance”). 
61 References to “microcredit” arise occasionally in this Article, however, 
because the development literature relied on often uses this term when it intends 
the wider menu of “microfinance.” 
62 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
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(“NGOs”) that provide credit.63  “Informal” institutions, including 
low-level moneylenders and self-help groups, are neither regulated 
nor registered, although their activities may fall within customary 
law.64  Governments going the “informal” route would make 
reparations payments in the form of shares in existing unregulated, 
unregistered local institutions.65 
Accountability, transparency, and protection of the rights and 
interests of shareholders and those who deal with them command 
a preference for formal or semiformal entities as reparations 
vehicles, unless only informal institutions are available during the 
nation’s transition.  Absent a minimal degree of economic 
development and stability, informal institutions could join the plan 
with the understanding that their connection to a government 
program demands a degree of extra oversight.  Engagement with 
national reparations would necessarily push the institution 
upward toward the semiformal category. 
Although this Article cannot provide detailed descriptions of 
the financial institutions with which national governments might 
build partnerships to effect reparations schemes, planners who 
devise reparations have the benefit of decades of development 
assessment as a base of relevant experience.  To be sure, 
reparations differ greatly from economic development initiatives, 
but the two categories of intervention have enough in common to 
support some preliminary thoughts about how formal, semiformal, 
and informal institutions fit within a reparations scheme.  
Generalization in this mode will be refined (or belied, if need be) at 
the planning stage by the varied encounters already experienced 
by most governments with microfinance. 
One common starting place for a reparations program, feasible 
in most countries that have started to emerge from crisis and 
falling under the “semiformal” category of microfinance 
institution, is the credit NGO.  A credit NGO typically offers small 
loans, often along with other interventions (education, counseling, 
health care), to its low-income clientele.66  Capitalized by external 
 
63 The Grameen Bank started out as a credit NGO, funded first by “soft loans 
and grants” before becoming more self-sustaining.  See Bruck, supra note 60, at 62 
(recounting early development of Grameen Bank). 
64 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1 n.2. 
65 See generally Douglas Snow, Microcredit: An Institutional Development 
Opportunity, 1 INT’L J. ECON. DEVELOPMENT 1 (1999) (“Sustainable microcredit 
programs must be embedded in the network of existing local institutions.”). 
66 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
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donor agencies, this entity would have been at work inside the 
strife-torn country before the government started to disburse 
reparations payments.  A reparations program could partner with 
a credit NGO in a transitional relationship aimed ultimately at 
forming a freestanding financial institution that citizen-recipients 
would own collectively.67  The NGO would deliver financial 
services to this clientele, along with practical help (like office space 
for its operations) on terms of cooperative ownership, until the 
membership of shareholders achieves the capacity to govern 
itself.68  Working with an existing credit NGO offers this 
reparations plan an established connection between funders and 
poor people, as well as the flexibility to take on new projects 
quickly;69 these advantages might outweigh the difficulties 
presented by shared governance. 
Reparations planners could alternatively pursue a type of 
partnership with a different mix of advantages and disadvantages 
for the program.  Governments might bypass (or be unable to 
engage) credit NGOs and instead link up with informal—
unregulated and unregistered—local institutions that function only 
as microfinancers.70  Recipients of reparations would acquire 
shares in existing entities that might have been formed as 
associations, cooperatives, or foundations.  Their government-
disbursed payments would join capital already held by the 
informal institution.  Such an arrangement would lack the access to 
capital and established routes to reach the poor that a credit NGO 
would likely have, but could pay undivided attention to 
microfinance and enjoy freedom to veer from the mandate of a 
foreign entity. 
A third possibility for reparations-through-microfinance is the 
formation of a new microfinance institution from the ground up.  
 
67 In Rwanda, for example, a nation that has tried to use microcredit as a 
constituent of reparations, an NGO called AVEGA extends microcredit to 
genocide widows.  See GLOBAL YOUTH CONNECT, RWANDA PROGRAM REPORT (2006), 
available at http://www.globalyouthconnect.org/pdf/rwanda_summer2005.pdf 
(describing the AVEGA program).  An existing relation like this could form the 
base of microfinance in contrast to microcredit. 
68 See SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 12 (noting 
institutional weaknesses in NGO governance).  See also Bruck, supra note 60, at 65 
(quoting one founder of a credit NGO: “’If you give them a loan and don’t see that 
their other needs are met, perhaps they are worse off.  They have a debt to repay, 
but still they have no sanitation, no health care, no education.’”). 
69 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 9. 
70 Id. at 12. 
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When choosing this approach, the government would make 
reparations payments in the form of shares in new institutions.  
Experience suggests that planners of this new entity should 
strongly consider building a revenue base consisting of more than 
government-directed transfer payments: adding the “savings of 
other people, no matter how small” would make the institution 
more likely to succeed in its community.71  The Arab sanadiq (a 
plural noun; singular sanduq) present a model for this approach.  
Sanadiq, financed by “a mixture of member-equity and external 
equity contributions,”72 have succeeded in Syria73 and offer a 
model for future reparations in Iraq.74 
In every form that a national reparations program might pick 
to convey reparations payments, the microfinance institution 
would establish recipients who had suffered violations of their 
human rights as owner-decisionmakers, thereby enhancing their 
agency in the process of rehabilitation.  Victims of abuses would 
receive reparations payments in the form of shares in an enterprise 
that offers them savings and the prospect of credit.  Pooled capital 
would become their shared portfolio, amenable to diversification 
and oriented toward pecuniary returns for its owners.75  
Restrictions on how to trade or otherwise alienate shares in the 
microfinance institution would necessarily vary from country to 
country in response to existing corporate law and the reparations 
 
71 Id. at 16. 
72 Id. at 18. 
73 Markus Buerli & Aden Aw-Hassan, Assessing the Impact of Village Credit and 
Savings Associations on the Rural Poor in Low Rainfall Areas in Syria, Deutscher 
Tropentag: Rurual Poverty Reduction Through Research for Development, 1 (Oct. 
5, 2004), http://www.tropentag.de/2004/abstracts/links/Buerli_fHJgUS4i.pdf. 
74 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 18. 
75 The government would need to resolve, preferably by transparent means, 
the contentious question of how much freedom these shareholders should have to 
govern their institution.  At present, a consensus in the development literature 
advocates the frank pursuit of profit by microfinance institutions: shelter from the 
market results in squandered opportunity, in this view.  A national government 
supportive of this stance would encourage recipients of reparations payments to 
become small capitalists.  As shareholders of their institutions, they could extend 
credit at uncapped interest rates and foreclose on loans no matter how poignant 
the defaulting debtors; in general they would live by a free-to-fail market 
ideology.  This development literature consensus could shift in the future to favor 
more regulation and less owner-manager prerogative. 
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goal of maximizing the autonomy, agency, and welfare of 
shareholder-recipients.76 
3.3. Simple Transfer Payments Contrasted 
Although microcredit is an extraordinarily popular tool in the 
development kit, even its admirers like to call it “no panacea,”77 
and counsel caution in its application.  The lexical move from 
“microcredit” to the vaguer (and, of course, debt-free, at least 
before the institution starts making loans) “microfinance” may ease 
some worries, but does not eliminate all controversy in the 
recommendation.  Scarcity is a precept that unites those who might 
otherwise disagree on reparations policy.  Microeconomic 
understandings of what choosers gain and lose, the 
macroeconomic theories that underlie development intervention, 
and national governments making policy decisions would all call 
on an advocate of microfinance in reparations to say why this 
particular expenditure makes sense as a means to effect a 
reparative goal when this choice would necessarily conflict with 
other means. 
The most straightforward alternative to microfinance is a 
simple cash transfer payment.78  Planners would arrange to 
 
76 See infra Section 4.1.2 (linking free trading of shares to community’s ability 
to pursue projects based on differing levels of risk tolerance). 
77 See, e.g., Tony Allen-Mills, No Panacea for World Poverty—Benefits of Micro-
Lending Called Into Question, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 5, 2009, at 10 (noting modest 
gains); Nan Dawkins Scully, Micro-Credit No Panacea for Poor Women, GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.gdrc.org/icm/wind/micro.html 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2009) (conceding that “[m]icroenterprise development has, in 
some circumstances, contributed positively to women’s empowerment”); Lisa 
Avery, Microcredit Extension in the Wake of Conflict: Rebuilding the Lives and 
Livelihoods of Women and Children Affected by War, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
205, 228 (2005) (“Microcredit is Not a Panacea”); Yunus, supra note 56 
(recommending more clarity in the definition of terms); Celia W. Taylor, 
Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & 
COM. 303, 320–35 (2002) (contending that the effects of microcredit on 
international law warrant more attention). 
78 Another, and to many observers a more attractive, alternative to 
microfinance and simple cash transfer payments would be “collective payments,” 
or social welfare spending, for the good of the entire public rather than to benefit 
individuals identified as victims of wrongdoing.  A government might establish 
new health clinics, for example, or implement programs that reduce or eliminate 
school fees.  Such spending would in many cases do more good for the country 
than pecuniary reparations for individuals.  One would hope that governments 
recognize the public good of expenditures on the needs of citizens.  This Article 
omits study of this alternative, however, in the belief that social welfare spending 
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distribute money to recipients.  Though attractive in its simplicity, 
the cash transfer alternative is inferior to microfinance in several 
ways.79 
The first advantage of microfinance over cash transfers is a 
practical one, as well as a reminder of the central role of security in 
reparations.  Functioning as shareholders in a microfinance 
institution gives recipients a safe place to store their monetary 
property, which includes not only reparations payments but also 
their savings.  Given the near certainty that poverty will 
accompany a reparations program, planners who seek to make 
pecuniary distributions need to address the question of whether a 
recipient can safely hold on to the money she receives.  Around the 
world, poor people—who never own absolutely nothing—suffer 
from this lack of basic security.  They struggle to find substitutes 
for the insured and well-guarded bank accounts that wealthy 
people take for granted.80  Savings first, then. 
Second, microfinance opens the possibility of expanding credit 
to the poor who would otherwise be regarded as ineligible to 
borrow money.  The government-funded microfinance institution 
would go on to lend out portions of its capital, probably offering 
small loans to borrowers in its community who would otherwise 
have little or no access to credit.  By this move, a significant share 
of reparations-money transitions through microfinance into 
microcredit, and partakes of microcredit’s considerable success.  
For reparations purposes, the curative effect of expanded credit 
reaches fundamentally into a victim’s well-being.  The word 
“victim,” the source of her entitlement to become a shareholder, 
loses its hold as this citizen moves to bankability.  Shakespeare 
notwithstanding, any person who may both “a borrower . . . [and] 
a lender be”81 is more autonomous, more likely to enjoy both self-
 
is not reparations.  Compare de Grieff, supra note 6, at 468–69 (detailing advantage 
and disadvantages of treating social welfare spending as reparations) with Rubio-
Marín, supra note 13, Transitional Societies, at 29 (advocating inclusion of social 
welfare spending in the reparations category). 
79 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 8; Hans Dieter Seibel & 
Andrea Armstrong, Reparations and Microfinance Schemes, in HANDBOOK, supra note 
2, at 676, 678. 
80 “With no safe place to store whatever money they have, the poor bury it, 
or buy livestock that may die, or invest in jewellery [sic] that may be stolen and 
can be hard to sell.”  Tom Easton, The Hidden Wealth of the Poor, ECONOMIST, Nov. 
3, 2005, at 3 (Survey of microfinance section). 
81 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 1, 
sc. 3. 
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respect and the respect of others, than a person shut out of both 
roles.  As they become investors, reconstructors, and rebuilders of 
the social tissue, these shareholders gain in relative social status, 
and by their work and risk-taking they earn this gain.82 
Third, through their investment decisions and eventual 
extraction of income from the microfinance institution, recipients 
gain routes to the social services that some deem at least as central 
to compensation for the human rights violations they experienced 
(planners think first of medical clinics, but counseling, adult 
education, and vocational and agricultural training are also among 
the possibilities). 83  A recipient who gains a cash transfer payment 
can obtain social services by spending the transfer on them; a 
recipient who obtains shares in a microfinance institution can 
obtain social services by turning her shares into cash and by 
directing investment into for-profit vehicles that make social 
services likely to emerge and flourish faster than they would from 
the injection of more money into the local economy—by elevating 
per capita income, engaging women as adult civic participants, and 
strengthening networks.  Microfinance thus comes closer than cash 
payments to the social investment alternative expenditure that 
some observers would prefer.  Indeed, over time microfinance 
delivers these other two types of recompense, cash and (for those 
recipients who want them) social services. 
The fourth point in the roster moves from individuals to 
societies:  in action, microfinance moves beyond savings and credit 
as pursued and deployed by citizens to social effects.  Any national 
repair following a total crisis requires both sustainable income-
generating activities and sustainable local entities that can extend 
capital to finance them.84  Neither of these two conditions will 
endure without the other; both call on citizens to participate in 
collective undertakings.  The establishment of microfinance 
 
82 Thanks to Ruth Rubio-Marín for underscoring this point. 
83 Reparations in Guatemala, for example, emphasize the need for social 
supports and direct relatively little funding to what the program calls “economic 
indemnification.”  Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey, Guatemala: Gender and Reparations for 
Human Rights Violations, in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN?  GENDER AND 
REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 92, 110 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2006).  
One alderman in Chicago issued a call for slavery reparations in the United States 
that would eschew transfer payments in favor of social supports.  Fran Spielman, 
Slavery Reparations Leaders Rip Bank’s Scholarship Offer, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2005, at 10. 
84 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1. 
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institutions for reparations supports both conditions.  New capital 
makes sustainable income-generating activities more likely to 
occur, and extending shareholder ownership to victims of human 
rights abuses engages these individuals in civic repair.  Hans 
Dieter Seibel has gone further, noting that new loci of economic 
power pull wealth away from a government that has been at best 
unreliable in the past.  Microfinance “creates alternative 
nongovernmental sources of power,” Seibel and Andrea 
Armstrong write, and thus “is a potential impediment to future 
abuses by the central government.”85  As a means of reparation, 
this measure enlists recipients into a common pursuit of 
institution-building and the relationships that follow the rise of 
stable institutions. 
To this four-item list of virtues—safe savings for the poor, 
enhancement of agency, expansion of services, and civic repair 
through the building of financial institutions—one might add a 
fifth pecuniary virtue that builds on the second and third points.  
Reparations programs that feature microfinance would capitalize 
on extraordinary worldwide enthusiasm for this measure,86 and 
thus might simply become more likely to happen.87  An 
international donor disinclined to finance a cash-transfer or social-
supports reparations program, on the ground that mending a 
nation following crisis is a task for government alone, may hold a 
different view of a program patterned in part on longstanding 
development initiatives. 
Many who laud this form of development have added hard 
capital of their own, not just words of praise, to the microfinance 
endeavor.  In the early 1980s, the then-governor of Arkansas, Bill 
Clinton, asked Muhammad Yunus for advice on applying 
Grameen Bank’s small-loan methods to alleviate poverty in his 
state.  Two decades later, this same man structured a Clinton 
Global Initiative that placed $30 million in microcredit funds in 
NGOs around the world.88  The story of the $27 loan that Dr. 
 
85 Seibel & Armstrong, Reparations Schemes, supra note 79, at 679. 
86 See Avery, supra note 77, at 224–225 (summarizing the achievements of 
microcredit programs); Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, supra note 12 
(recognizing the positive impact of microcredit programs conducted by the 2006 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureates). 
87 It would be irresponsible not to acknowledge, in a work on reparations, 
that some reparations plans fail. 
88 Clinton Global Initiative, Grameen Foundation USA’s Growth Guarantees 
Program, 2005, http://rews.clintonglobalinitiative.org/CGIsite/commitmentnote 
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Yunus made out of his own pocket to Bangladeshi basket weavers 
in 1976 has spurred a multibillion-dollar business which includes 
some of the world’s largest financial institutions, such as Citibank, 
Deutsche Bank, and the Dutch giant ABN AMRO.89  Microcredit 
also appeals to big businesses beyond big banks: As one 
industrialist remarked at a microcredit summit, success in 
microlending would mean new prospective customers for his own 
company.90 
As this Article goes to press, “microcredit” as a buzzword still 
enjoys continuing popularity with numerous and varied sources of 
development funding.91  No jargon will stay eternally in fashion.  
By any name, however, microcredit presents a macro-prescription: 
the fostering of gainful economic activity through small loans for 
which lenders expect and enforce repayment.  As such, it will 
continue to appeal to sources of capital located outside the 
boundaries of the nation that builds a reparations scheme.92  This 
 
.asp?ID=218024 (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).  Other American politicians admire 
microcredit, too.  Introduced in the United States Senate, the Women and 
Children in Conflict Protection Act of 2003 sought to extend microcredit to 
society’s most vulnerable classes, including refugees and internally displaced 
persons.  See Women and Children in Conflict Protection Act of 2003, S. 1001, 
108th Cong. § 306(e) (2003) (detailing microfinance grants to specific persons and 
institutions).  Aiming to implement sustainable programs equipped to address 
acute humanitarian needs, this bill includes provisions for microcredit as a source 
of enhanced economic security for women as household providers.  Id. § 306(a)–
(d). 
89 Alison Benjamin, Dollar a Week Bank is Still a Success, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, 
Jun. 19, 2009, at 44 (reporting expansion of Grameen programs into New York, via 
Citibank); Mark Sappenfield & Mark Trumbull, Big Banks Find Little Loans a Nobel 
Winner, Too, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 16, 2006, World, at 1, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1016/p01s03-wogi.html (describing the 
business appeal of microfinance programs). 
90 Hugh Grant, Chief Operating Officer, Monsanto Co., Remarks at the 
Microcredit Summit +5 (Mar. 2003) (transcript available in Microcredit Summit E-
News, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/enews/2003-03_sp_grant.html. 
91 See, e.g., Sara Corbett, Can the Cellphone Help End Global Poverty?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, (Magazine), at 34 (explaining the role of microfinance in 
developing village phone-sharing initiatives); Cheryl Hall, Big D Givers Embrace 
Micro-Loans Programs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 26, 2008, Business, at 1D 
(addressing Grameen affiliate initiatives that support local Texan businesses like 
beauty parlors and auto repair shops); Jim Simon, In Kenya, Ambitions for 
Microfinance Grow, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2009,  at 27. 
92 For a more cynical expression of this point, see Walden Bello, Microcredit, 
Macro Issues, NATION, Oct. 14, 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc 
/20061030/bello (arguing “establishment circles” support microcredit programs 
largely because they present a market-based economic strategy without the 
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sector of foreign supporters reliably prefers entrepreneurship to 
mere “handout[s],”93 or what Seibel has called “one-off 
payments.”94  Another virtue that might remain central—long after 
the Year of Microcredit has ended—is that while this technique 
flatters neoliberalism and the politicians who promote markets in 
the West, microcredit can also be practiced in harmony with 
Islam.95 Partnerships between national reparations-through-
microfinance plans and foreign sources of capital could thus arise 
in Muslim contexts with relatively little worry about potential 
backlash—an unusual advantage for a device that gets praised 
both as feminist96 and for offering a secular alternative in the 
Muslim nation of Bangladesh.97 
 
serious side effects that have arisen from alternative market-based plans, such as 
the World Bank’s infamous structural adjustment policies). 
93 On the contrast between the two, see Can Technology Eliminate Poverty?, 
BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Dec. 26, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine 
/content/05_52/b3965025.htm (“I get very upset when people say [the poorest] 
people don’t have the entrepreneurial ability, initiative, and skills to use loans, so 
they need some other kind of intervention like subsidy, handout, or charity.” 
(quoting Muhammad Yunus) (alteration in original)); Evelyn Iritani, Tiny Loans 
Seen as Big Way to Invest in Developing Nations’ Poor, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at C1 
(reporting strong entrepreneurial interest in microcredit particularly because of its 
“hand-up, not a handout” approach to poverty); Corbett, supra note 91, at 34 
(describing a Grameen initiative that uses microcredit to facilitate rural access to 
cell phones through local entrepreneurs). 
94 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that, in 
contrast to microfinance, the benefits of such payments “tend to be short-lived 
and unsustainable”). 
95 Zofeen Ebrahim, Pakistan: Islamic Banking is Microcredit Too, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, Feb. 5, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32041 (reporting that 
one microcredit lender in Pakistan espouses the religious tenet of Qarze-e-Hasna, 
or “helping someone in need with interest-free loans, which are preferred over 
charity”).  The question of interest on the loans would play a part in Muslim 
opinions of microcredit schemes, but poses no insurmountable hurdle.  After all, 
enterprises currently transact financial business in the Muslim world while 
respecting its disapproval of interest.  Jerry Useem, Banking on Allah, FORTUNE, 
June 10, 2002, at 154, 156 (describing Islamic approaches to financial transactions, 
including murabaha, a method that resembles interest, and darura, the excuse of 
“overriding necessity”). 
96 See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, supra note 12 
(acknowledging the empowering role of microcredit for women). 
97 See Celia W. Dugger, Peace Prize to Pioneer of Loans for Those Too Poor to 
Borrow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, at A6 (“In the overwhelmingly Muslim nation of 
Bangladesh, Mr. Yunus’s approach also offered hope and ideas to compete with 
the allure of fundamentalist Islamic causes.  ‘It’s a very secular movement,’ 
Professor [Amartya] Sen said, ‘very egalitarian, market friendly and socially 
radical.’”). 
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Microcredit has offered much to many: one magazine 
characterized the gains as “Millions for Millions.”98  It need not 
deliver on everyone’s ambitious dream to help a reparations plan.  
Popularity itself is a useful virtue, and reparations programmers 
who avail themselves of microfinance would be connected to 
sources of powerful external support. 
4. THE ALIGNMENT OF MICROFINANCE WITH REPARATIONS AS 
INFORMED BY TORT THEORY 
A program that disburses pecuniary reparations in the form of 
shares in microfinance institutions would augment the security 
and freedom of citizen recipients and thus, as elaborated in the 
previous Part, align with aspirations central to tort law.  Equally 
important, microfinance as a mode of pecuniary reparations 
strengthens the promise of tort law as a means to effect justice for 
individuals.  Simple cash transfer payments to individuals comport 
with the ambitions of tort law, but microfinance does so with more 
force. 
4.1. Augmenting Security and Freedom 
4.1.1. Microfinance and security 
In prosperous nations, tort remedies presume that judgments 
yield money and that successful plaintiffs will receive these funds 
in a form they can save or spend as they choose.  Spenders get the 
benefit of what they buy; savers get the comfort of knowing they 
can spend later.  This belief is not especially accurate, even when 
one puts aside the fact that even in the United States, a country 
perceived as litigious, most victims of tortious conduct do not sue 
and most lawsuits are resolved by means other than a judgment.99 
In nations suited to considering reparations schemes, the 
presumption grows more inaccurate still.  The poor—and a large 
 
98 Bruck, supra note 60. 
99 See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 
443, 448–52 (1987) (noting studies that indicate a low incidence of tort claims 
arising out of injuries in the United States); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An 
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 459, 515–16 (2004) (documenting high settlement rate as one of many 
mechanisms for dispute resolution obviating the need for trial resolution); Gilles, 
supra note 53, at 617–23 (reporting high proportion of potential defendants who 
are judgment-proof). 
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number of reparations recipients will be poor—often cannot save, 
and not because they need to consume all their income for 
survival.  As was mentioned, bank accounts remain out of reach 
for many poor people around the world, who must resort to 
dangerous methods of holding their savings:  burial (as in under a 
mattress, or in the ground); jewelry that is vulnerable to theft and 
usually cannot be sold quickly for its full value; and animals that 
die, get sick, get stolen, and wander away.100 
When governments disburse money, other threats to security 
arise even for recipients who have a safe place to store it.  The 
trauma to the nation that preceded the reparations program 
compels planners to anticipate threats to safety in the disbursement 
of payments.  Conflict-torn regions are littered with armaments 
like guns and grenades; demobilized soldiers who know how to 
use these weapons are often present as well.101  Microfinance 
institutions struggle with this danger on the ground. 
As a response to this problem, one report offers microfinance 
institutions practical advice toward advancing security.  It seeks 
mainly to prevent armed robberies, which threaten institutions and 
their human constituencies.102  Tipsheet pointers (e.g., “[n]either 
staff nor clients should wear uniforms or organizational T-shirts or 
outfits which may identify who might be carrying money”)103 do 
not of themselves build a “failsafe” institution.104  But a local 
microfinance entity might nevertheless be the safest place for a 
recipient to store the money she receives, and microfinance has 
great potential to increase security even for those who do not 
participate as shareholders.  When a microfinance institution is the 
only bank-like entity within reach and can offer a modicum of 
security to its customers, the money the recipients deposit there 
will generally be safer from loss than money they keep at home. 
When a local microfinance institution exists near a commercial 
bank, this institution can offer recipients security-enhancing 
benefits that the nearby commercial bank may not be able to give 
 
100 Easton, supra note 80. 
101 See KENNETH GRABER, MICROENTERPRISES BEST PRACTICES, SECURITY ISSUES 
FOR MICROFINANCE FOLLOWING CONFLICT 1–2 (2001), http://www.gdrc.org/icm 
/disasters/Following_Conflict_Brief_6f.pdf (describing the unique dangers posed 
by the lingering effects of combat in post-conflict societies). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 3. 
104 Id. at 5. 
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them.  For example, a recipient might be too small an account-
holder to have access to a commercial account, but holding 
reparations-based shares in a microfinance institution could 
convey to her this additional security whenever microfinance 
institutions band together, offering low-tech shelter to members in 
their dealings with the nearby commercial bank.  A group of 
otherwise vulnerable recipients could travel together when 
carrying money, receive checks rather than cash from the 
commercial bank, and have space to welcome representatives of 
the commercial bank who come to meetings bearing cash.105 
By bringing together enterprise-minded individuals with cash 
on their hands, microfinance settings also offer a venue for creative 
thinking on how to store money safely and enhance the safety of 
familiar settings.106  They provide a locus from which to initiate or 
expand the furnishing of insurance, a commodity that poor people 
around the world desperately want.  Researchers find strong 
demand for insurance in the developing world, particularly against 
drought, harm to livestock, and funeral or burial expenses.107  
Entities supported by government reparations payments would 
have the capital to meet some of this demand.  Engaging 
microfinance institutions would thus add force to the security that 
tort principles seek to extend. 
 
105 Id. at 4–5. 
106 For example, in 1984 the Association of Rickshaw Pullers of Zaire worked 
out a scheme to deposit part of a day’s receipts with a respected elder.  When the 
elder is a woman, the record of deposit is called a mamma-card; a deposit with a 
male elder is a papa-card.  Before the onset of this system, the rickshaw pullers 
had no safe place to store their income.  Ass’n of Rickshaw Pullers of Zaire, Papa-
Card or Mamma-Card: Innovative Way for Credit, http://www.gdrc.org/icm 
/inspire/papa-mamma.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).  In West Africa, mobile 
bankers called susu in Ghana and esusu in Nigeria have evolved to allow poor 
people to maintain savings accounts.  These savers have to pay a small fee every 
month to do so, rather than collect interest; they favor the arrangement because it 
keeps their money safe and establishes a relationship with a banker who might be 
available later to make a small loan.  WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT: 
THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND VOICE 173 (2001). 
107 Stefan Dercon, a professor of development economics at Oxford, has 
explored the issue in several contexts.  See, e.g., Stefan Dercon, Insurance Against 
Poverty Overview, Jan. 2003, at 2, http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members 
/stefan.dercon/overview%20document%20insurance%20against%20poverty 
_new.pdf (arguing poor people are “least able to cope with risk and shocks, and 
therefore would benefit most from protection”); Stefan Dercon et al., Group-Based 
Funeral Insurance in Ethiopia and Tanzania 5–6 (Ctr. for the Study of African 
Economies, Working Paper No. 227, 2004), available at http://www.bepress.com 
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=csae (finding funeral associations 
may be useful model for “other developmental activities”). 
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4.1.2. Microfinance and Freedom 
Giving recipients money in the form of shares in a microfinance 
institution enhances their freedom as owners, entrepreneurs, and 
policymakers.  Under the reparations scheme advocated here, 
these individuals would receive not only money from their 
government but, later on, applications from persons in their 
community seeking to borrow some of this capital from the 
institution.  Thus money quickly conveys to victims of human 
rights abuses a modicum of power over their future.  They would 
have a legislative-like say in appropriations that affect human 
lives.  They might ask, “Do we want a well, an electric plant, a 
feedlot, an expanded transport?”  In the answer they express, they 
would establish themselves as builders of a sustainable order. 
 One American donor who had managed a mutual fund before 
devoting her time to microfinance projects reported raptly on her 
observation of microfinance in Vietnam as an expander of freedom: 
Does everyone succeed?  No.  But it is the same in the 
investment business.  You don’t want to take a lot of risk?  
Buy some ducks. But the more risk-taking borrowers will 
pool their loans and buy a baby water buffalo and rent it to 
men for farming.  And then there are those who blow right 
past livestock and build a brick factory.108 
4.1.3. Justice for Individuals 
A microfinance scheme rather than a simple transfer payments 
scheme addresses the concern that many observers and recipients 
of pecuniary reparations have expressed about the limits of cash as 
redress for injury.  Recall that victims of human rights abuses feel 
ambivalent about monetary payments known to some of them as 
“blood money.”109  If Tom Tyler and Hulda Thorisdottir are correct 
to say that for victim-recipients money is never enough, and leaves 
them hungry for a sense of “moral accountability,”110 then 
microfinance is a uniquely strong form of pecuniary reparation. 
 
108 Bruck, supra note 60, at 64. 
109 de Greiff, supra note 6, at 461; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
110 Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 24. 
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In addition to the greater force of increasing agency during the 
process of reparations,111 microfinance adds strength through its 
preoccupation with accountability and honest books.  A cash 
transfer appropriates a large sum of money and divides it into 
handouts or “one-off payments.”112  For recipients, this payment 
may bear an air of “Here you are, happy now?  For God’s sake, no 
revolution, please.”  Endowing recipients with shares in a 
microfinance institution, by contrast, emphasizes the government’s 
commitment, permanence, and seriousness of purpose.  Under 
ordinary conditions of liquidity within the microfinance institution 
chosen for the plan, a recipient might be able to turn her 
distribution into one-off payment money and nothing more, but 
she would have to work to get that result.113  The default setting 
would establish her as a shareholder in an ongoing enterprise.  In 
her role as owner-manager, a person playing some role in the 
review of loan applications, she would necessarily think about 
repayment in terms of justice and rectification. 
A microfinance scheme for distribution also strengthens the 
possibility that the government would use subrogation in the 
seizure of wrongdoers’ assets.114  In order to choose microfinance 
over the simpler transfer payments scheme, the government would 
have to commit itself to a more detailed set of books.  It would 
know not only who was receiving payments but where those 
payments were going, at least at their first point of transfer.  
Thereafter, the regulations affecting the functions of the 
microfinance institution would provide further monitoring of these 
funds.115  This level of regulatory detail might convince overseas 
banks holding wrongdoers’ assets that the nation emerging from 
chaos can be trusted to control the monies they would turn over.  
This confidence in the future would encourage such a turnover, 
 
111 See supra Section 3.3 (discussing advantages of microfinance over simple 
cash transfers). 
112 Seibel, supra note 9, at 1; see also supra  note 94 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra text accompanying notes 136–38 (discussing the cultural and legal 
obstacles encountered by women in maintaining property in their own name). 
114 See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing vicarious liability in the 
context of proposed unit within national government that would seek 
indemnification from wrongdoers). 
115 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (noting the microfinance 
institution that would receive payments might be a formal institution, meaning a 
regulated entity, or a semiformal institution, meaning a registered entity whose 
existence is known to the government; even institutions in the “informal” 
category might be upgraded later). 
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and next this transformation of ill gained wealth into lawfully held 
funds would help to satisfy recipients that what they receive 
consists of shares in an endeavor to link money with justice rather 
than injustice. 
5.  MICROFINANCE PAYMENTS AS SOURCES OF GENDER FAIRNESS 
AND WELFARE 
According to the many admirers of microfinance, this 
innovation, particularly it’s variant of “microcredit,” permits 
women to flourish.  The citation for the Nobel Prize awarded to 
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank mentioned women’s 
liberation as one of the effects of microcredit.116  Conventional 
wisdom holds that women who receive microloans work hard, 
repay debts faithfully, encourage fellow borrowers to comply with 
loan terms, and, perhaps, manifest ideals of community and team-
player solidarity from which a male-dominated model of 
commercial banking could learn.117 
In response, critics have called microcredit a false cure for 
female poverty and powerlessness.118  As United Nations Secretary 
 
116 See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, supra note 12 and 
accompanying text (“Micro-credit has proved to be an important liberating force 
in societies where women in particular have to struggle against repressive social 
and economic conditions.”). 
117 See Avery, supra note 77, at 221–22 (explaining group-based lending 
encourages compliance with loan terms through peer pressure of maintaining 
good credit for the group); Fundacíon Adelante, What We Do: Our Loan Program, 
http://www.adelantefoundation.org/loan_program.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 
2009) (attributing a better than 95% repayment rate to “character-based lending” 
to poor female borrowers in Honduras, in contrast to traditional “collateral-based 
lending”). 
118 Drake Bennett, Small Change, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/09/20/small_change
_does_microlending_actually_fight_poverty/ (“And while microcredit champions 
point to microloans as a tool for empowering women, the studies see no impact 
on gender roles, and find evidence that if any one group benefits more, it’s male 
entrepreneurs with existing businesses.”); Barbara Crossette, Experts Question 
Wisdom of Micro-Credit for Women, WOMEN’S E-NEWS, Mar. 2, 2003, 
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1284; Anne Marie Goetz & 
Rina Sen Gupta, Who Takes the Credit?  Gender, Power, and Control Over Loan Use in 
Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEV. 45, 47 (1996) (noting that male 
relatives control much of the loaned capital that women are obliged to repay); 
Gina Neff, Microcredit, Microresults, 74 LEFT BUS. OBSERVER 1, 4–5 (Oct. 1996), 
available at http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/Micro.html (criticizing Yunus 
and the Grameen bank for failing to lift most borrowers out of poverty and 
arguing that entrepreneurship rhetoric diverts women from wage labor that 
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General Kofi Annan put this objection in a 1999 report to the 
General Assembly, it is “lack of access to land,” rather than a lack 
of loans, that presents the most critical single cause of rural 
poverty.”119  On the Grameen fix, the Annan report expressed 
skepticism, stating “a certain sense of proportion regarding micro-
credit would seem to be in order.”120  This critique prompts a 
useful reminder of the difference between “microcredit” and 
“microfinance” for reparations purposes:  the microfinance scheme 
advocated here does not create the burden of new debt because it 
regards reparations payments as conveyed outright, rather than 
loaned to recipients.  Thus, even if critics are correct to worry about 
the imposition of loan repayment obligations on women who may 
not be able to control the money they borrow, that concern does 
not pertain to the reparations plan advocated here. 
This reservation noted, microfinance and what one World Bank 
report calls gender equality—a term defined there to include 
“equality under the law, equality of opportunity (including 
equality of rewards for work and equality in access to human 
capital and other productive resources that enable opportunity), 
and equality of voice (the ability to influence and contribute to the 
development process)”121—have common elements.  Both have to 
do, at least in part, with the distribution of material goods.122  Both 
are secular phenomena.  Both are at least consistent with, if not 
committed to, the seizure of new opportunity by historically 
oppressed persons.  As practiced around the world, microfinance 
puts money in the hands of women, an outcome that advocates of 
gender equality pursue. 
To add tort theory to the mix of gender and microfinance, 
consider the quest for security and freedom that underlies tort 
actions as prosecuted in the courts.  Tort principles emerge with 
reference to the purposes and functions of civil liability as policy.  
Its doctrine compels wrongdoers to pay damages to their victims 
 
would pay better, and also restricts women borrowers to low-yield work that men 
do not want to do). 
119 Crossette, supra note 118. 
120 Id. 
121 WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN 
RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND VOICE 2–3, (2001), available at http://www-wds 
.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/03/01 
/000094946_01020805393496/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
122 Some strands of “feminism” do not share this inclination: “gender 
equality,” by contrast, cannot escape the material world. 
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not only to enhance the freedom and security of individuals in the 
correct balance but also, at a societal and conceptual plane, to 
achieve results.  Welfare and fairness are its two chief desiderata.  
Fairness (associated with corrective justice) looks backward, to 
redress injury attributed to wrongdoing.  From this perspective, 
leaving the injury without a remedy is wrong.  Some observers of 
tort law regard fairness as central; others deem it peripheral and 
subordinate to its rival, welfare.  Reparations through microfinance 
comports with both fairness and welfare. 
5.1. Reparations Through Microfinance as a Source of Fairness for 
Women 
5.1.1. Ameliorating the Additional Injustice of Having Been 
Deprived of a Fair Measure of Control Over Money 
The endeavor of planning reparations for recent human rights 
violations coexists with a less vivid, but older and more deeply 
rooted, wrong:  throughout human history, and continuing to this 
moment, women in the aggregate have not enjoyed equality with 
men with respect to the possession of and control over wealth.  
Laws and norms have taken money out of their hands as if women 
were moral children and money something too dangerous for them 
to hold.  A generation ago, the United Nations made a famed 
announcement on point:  “Women do two-thirds of the world’s 
work [as measured in hours], earn one-tenth of the world’s income, 
and own less than one-hundredth of the world’s property.”123 
Although the United Nations has not updated this notorious 
statistic about the world, local studies have continued to find that 
disparities remain.  For example, the United Nations Millennium 
Task Force reported in 2005 that women produce up to 80% of the 
household food in Africa and the Caribbean,124 and that women in 
Zambia devote an extraordinary 800 hours a year to gathering food 
and firewood.125 Ownership of land—a time-honored means for 
individuals to accrete economic strength—is less available to 
women than men, particularly in developing countries.  The World 
 
123 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 21 (2006) (citing UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S WOMEN (1979)). 
124 U.N. Millennium Project, Task Force on Educ. and Gender Inequality, 
Taking Action: Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women 77 (2005). 
125 Id. at 7–8. 
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Bank reports that many national laws still place women under the 
guardianship of husbands and recognize “no independent right to 
manage property.”126  Several African countries deny married 
women the right to own land127 and take land ownership away 
from women who become widowed or divorced.128 Studies of 
cultivated-land ownership in Asia and Latin America as well as 
Africa show that women possess smaller parcels, inferior land, and 
less farming equipment than what men possess.129 
These conditions—more toil, less income, and much less 
property for women—persist and appear more benevolent than 
they are with the help of ideology.  Patriarchy posits a male 
provider who heads his household and meets the needs of the 
women and children inside.  It further asserts that the women 
inside are better off than they would be under conditions of gender 
parity.130  The male-headed household protects women from their 
various infirmities regarding money and property.  Women, it has 
been said around the world, are too naive to manage money, too 
swayed by emotion to retain it, too busy with child-making and 
child-minding to have time for it, too petty-minded to leverage it, 
or too pure to want it.  A dire pattern in many parts of the world, 
 
126 WORLD BANK, supra note 121, at 37. 
127 Id. (including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland). 
128 Id. at 51. 
129 Id. at 51–52; see also, id. at 120–21 (reporting that much land reform of the 
1990s in Latin American and Africa has failed to alleviate these conditions). 
130 One expression of this ideology argues that it benefits women: 
 The women of every society save our own have understood that the 
male’s nature is such that he must be given a special position in the 
family if he is to peacefully take his place in it . . . .  Women have realized 
that men will not even attempt to suppress [their socially disruptive] 
tendencies if they are offered no distinctive and respected position in the 
family, a position that can act as counterpoise to both the limits marriage 
sets on male behavior and the centrality that the woman’s unique 
physiological and psychological bond to the infant automatically gives 
her. . . . 
   In response to the refusal to grant them their traditional role men will 
tend to either a) disrupt the family as they attain through aggression that 
which they were once granted, or b) channel their energies into sexual 
conquest outside the family. Women will find that they are raising their 
children either on a battlefield or alone, wondering why loudmouthed 
Rambos have replaced strong, silent defenders of justice and protectors 
of women. 
Steven Goldberg, Can Women Beat Men at Their Own Game?, NAT’L REV., Dec. 27, 
1993, at 30. 
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unequal educational opportunities for girls and young women is 
both a symptom and cause of these beliefs. 
Payments in the form of shares in a microfinance institution 
serve to repair this unfairness more effectively than other forms of 
pecuniary reparations.  Regardless of the level of formality of the 
microfinance,131 these shares can work to rectify historical gender-
injustice.  Formal institutions offer women recipients access to 
technology, and services that had been closed off to most of them 
in the past.  The category of semi-formal institutions available for 
reparations through microfinance is dominated by 
nongovernmental organizations, which can offer female recipients 
a range of support as well as a place to hold their reparations 
shares.  Informal institutions can advance women’s interests by 
honoring compatible local traditions and promoting ideals of self-
help.132 
The simultaneous creation of both a savings account and a 
modicum of power over the economic lives of other people 
bestows property on women whose value exceeds the sum 
transferred.  Shares in microfinance institutions give all women 
recipients at least de-facto savings accounts (which might 
previously have been out of their reach), and for some fraction of 
recipients creates real opportunities to govern the institution.  
Because virtually every microfinance institution makes loans, these 
women shareholders have a voice in capital investment decisions 
affecting their communities.  A reparations payment with the name 
of a woman on it links these small savings accounts and shares in a 
business with the rectification of injustice.  If microfinance can 
generate even a portion of the wealth that its admirers believe it 
can create, then a reparations scheme that transfers shares of a 
microfinance institution to women as recipients and owners will 
improve dramatically the statistic that half the world’s population 
owns less than a hundredth of its property. 
Shares in a microfinance institution thus help women take a 
stand against both the injustice of human rights violations and the 
unjust effects of patriarchy within a national economy.  Patriarchy 
had instructed women to renounce any desire for overt power in 
hopes of gaining security in return.  Microfinance teaches just the 
opposite:  that the security one receives from holding money takes 
 
131 See SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 4 (sketching three 
levels of formality). 
132 Id. at 14–16 (describing informal microfinance institutions). 
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form not in a wall or barrier from public life but in decisions, 
choices, and investment.  Shareholders affect their own wishes and 
respond to the material consequences of what they express.  
Whether they participate in microfinance while unable to forget the 
human rights violations for which they received monetary 
compensation, or, at the other extreme, feel determined never to 
think about their past and only look forward as investors, they 
reclaim what was theirs all along, the sense of recognition and 
agency. 
In standing up against both acute crises and quotidian 
patriarchy, this measure of reparation emphasizes what the two 
evils have in common.  The stated transformation of wrongdoing 
and suffering into shares for holders who may have had no prior 
experience with financial instruments reminds participants and 
observers of the connection between, on one hand, the episode of 
oppression that gave rise to a reparations scheme, and on the other, 
the duller background condition of women disabled from full 
rights to own property.  To name these two wrongs in the same 
sentence is not to equate them.  The first is not only more vivid but 
worse.  However, linking a historical antecedent with a facet of 
everyday life does not deny any portion of the horror inherent in a 
particular national crisis. 
On the contrary, catastrophes become both more intense and 
more poignant when one becomes aware of an infrastructure that 
amplifies their harm.  To put the point more optimistically, a 
reparative project that enables women to hold and spend their own 
money installs an architecture that can help achieve other repairs, 
should a subsequent crisis ensue.  An architecture that puts money 
in all its facets—saving, spending, diverting, withholding, 
encouraging, investing—in the hands of women also makes civil 
society stronger. 
5.1.2. Fairness Through Shareholding Rather than the Receipt of 
Quick Cash 
As we have seen, one reason policymakers choose shares in 
microfinance institutions as the means of effecting pecuniary 
reparations is to augment “security,” in the sense of allowing a 
recipient to keep her payment safely rather than have to hide it in 
her home or convert it into none-too-safe chattels that could be 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1
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destroyed or taken from her.133  Reparations through microfinance 
offers security in other senses, including the prospect of leveraging 
one’s payment into additional income that can buy more shelter 
from various dangers—cleaner food and water, safer housing, 
respite from exhausting or dangerous labor—and the fostering of 
sustainable income-generating activities.134  There remains for brief 
treatment here one more crucial security theme, present in any 
plan for pecuniary reparations:  the danger that (male) relatives or 
intimate partners could seize money nominally distributed to 
(female) recipients. 
Layers of complication challenge the delivery of security—and 
freedom-enhancing increments to women through any pecuniary 
reparations program, not just the microfinance variant advocated 
here.  Some recipients might, in particular, wish to share or 
relinquish what they receive, and believe they enjoy more freedom 
or more security as a consequence.  A wife may know that her 
husband had his eye on a bicycle or a truck, from which purchase 
she would also gain some attenuated benefit.  If he had been idle 
and depressed, she might believe he would feel heartened, and 
thus become easier to live with, by the boost of money in his 
pocket.  A handout to a man from a woman might also ameliorate 
difficulties inside the home when a man impinges on his family’s 
security by making threats to leave, to become violent, or to take 
up dangerous work for the sake of earning income. 
Should these examples sound drearily anti-male, amiable men 
will serve the point almost as well.  A good man may too have 
suffered in the old days and been treating his woman kindly 
during hard times; might our recipient not want to share her 
money with him?  A recipient of reparations money might feel 
indebted to her man for shelter and other boons from intimate 
partners. 
Or consider children.  Some, if not most, women who receive 
reparations money would, without hesitation, try to share it with 
the next generation.  Notwithstanding de Greiff’s warning that 
“the responsibilities of a program of reparation are not the same as 
that of a development or social investment plan,”135 mothers would 
 
133 See Easton, supra note 80, at 3 and accompanying text. 
134 See SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1, 6–9 and 
accompanying text. 
135 de Greiff, supra note 6, at 451, 471. 
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certainly spend part of their reparations funds on education, health 
care, and food for their young. 
Overriding such choices by women, or making them difficult to 
effect, could undermine the ambitions of compensation.  The large 
feminist literature on choice and agency cautions against accusing 
women of “false consciousness” for manifesting decisions that 
appear self-negating,136 but offers little guidance on how to make 
reparations money stay with the women who receive it.  Here, 
thinking about security and freedom becomes helpful after the fact 
as a way to understand what might otherwise look like 
squandering.  The point of the endeavor had been to enhance the 
security and freedom of recipients.  Recipients’ diverting their 
money to men and children might have been consistent with this 
goal. 
That said, however, it would be a facile error to condone any 
and every distribution of reparations payments as always (with the 
help of tautology) enhancing the security and freedom of their 
female recipients.  Reparations programs owe to recipients not 
only the rendering of a designated payment, but also the 
safeguards that protect it from both intentional and unintended 
disappearance.  Like commercial creditors, investors, and 
mortgagees, women recipients of reparations are entitled to enjoy 
whatever the rule of law can provide to safeguard their property.  
Accordingly, a program’s design must anticipate foreseeable 
obstacles to delivery and receipt of the transfer of wealth. 
When recipients are women, one key obstacle worthy of 
attention is the belief that women should not have the power to 
spend money on their own, or for themselves.  One can envision 
women who simply do not feel entitled to make spending 
decisions that enrich themselves directly until they know that their 
families’ needs have been satisfied first.  A reparations planner 
probably cannot thwart such an inclination, but each payment 
should have a chance to get to each individual woman first, rather 
than to her men or dependent children.  Shares in an institution 
 
136 See, e.g. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 324–50 (1995); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist 
Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1139–40 
(1993); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, Consenting Adults?:  Why Women Who Submit to 
Supervisory Sexual Harassment Are Faring Better in Court Than Those Who Say No . . . 
and Why They Shouldn’t, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 25 (2008) (describing 
ambiguous views of female agency in sexual harassment case law and 
commentary). 
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achieve this result better than any other rendering of money.  
These shares have women’s names on them.  They implicitly 
contain protection against theft and loss.  They state plainly that 
recipients include individual women (or men), and are not paid 
only to households, families, or communities. 
These specifics might provoke an objection, familiar from the 
gender controversies surrounding microcredit in the Grameen 
mode, that recognizing women as individuals with competence in 
worldly realms and who hold personal identities separate from 
household and tribe offends the cultural norms of a particular 
country, and thus that such a reparations scheme would be 
unsustainable in that venue. 
This objection should be seen either as mere vapor that rises 
from what activist Sara Hlupekile Longwe has called “the 
patriarchal cooking pot”137 and rejected, or else taken seriously and 
heeded.  In other words, perhaps there really are places where 
cultural predilection and commercial backwardness intersect to 
destroy basic safeguards that would otherwise protect property 
transferred to women.  Where the claim of absent safeguards is 
credible, program designers should, in the name of fairness, 
reconsider their plan of paying recompense to individuals.  A 
society that cannot foster women holding property in their own 
name—one treats women only as the means, never the end, of a 
program that affects national repair—is one whose reparations 
scheme ought to be confined to non-pecuniary measures.  Insisting 
on naming women as payees would promote strife in such a 
setting.  Cash changing hands under the contrary approach, one 
that defers to patriarchy rather than resists it, would reach the 
wrong people and go to waste. 
As the experience of microcredit around the world 
demonstrates, however, some women even in backward economic 
settings have held their property successfully.138  The limited 
successes of microcredit would be enhanced by shareholding in 
contrast to the receipt of quick cash, which non-recipients could 
grab and squander.  Shares in a financial institution, in sum, can 
offer the best prospects for fairness in the delivery of pecuniary 
reparations. 
 
137 Sara Hlupekile Longwe, The Evaporation of Gender Policies in the Patriarchal 
Cooking Pot, 7 DEV.  PRAC. 148, 148 (1997). 
138 On the disputes surrounding this point, see supra note 118 and 
accompanying text. 
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5.1.3. Reparations Through Microfinance as a Source of Gender-
Egalitarian Welfare 
In contrast to the fairness perspective, welfare analysis looks 
forward, striving to increase wealth for persons in the aggregate.  It 
seeks incentives.  In the context of personal injury law, the welfare 
perspective encourages legal systems to force inflictors of injury to 
pay for the injuries they cause when the internalization of these 
costs of harm-causing activities would enhance social wealth.139  
Recognizing that human activity produces prosperity along with 
losses, welfare analysis seeks to foster optimal rather than 
unbounded investments in safety.  Thus, it requires those who 
inflict injury to pay only for not having taken cost-justified 
measures, rather than every possible measure, to avoid causing 
injury.140 
Welfare analysis of injury law may appear to deviate slightly 
from the scope of this Article.  First, it is normally used to study 
accidental harm, not the intentional or reckless injuries that 
reparations programs address.  Second, in principle, welfare 
analysis does not pursue the compensation of victims, but rather 
the imposition of monetary sanctions.  As long as the injurer pays, 
and as long as potential injurers as a group have to take into 
account their obligations to pay should they injure someone, it 
matters little to welfare analysis whether any injured person 
collects anything.  However, these deviations do not limit the value 
of the exercise.  Nothing in welfare analysis precludes its 
application to intentionally or recklessly inflicted harms,141 and 
efficiency-minded scholars have recognized that because fines and 
other public sanctions are typically under-used and too cheap:  
empowering the victim as recipient can help to ensure that 
wrongdoers pay at the optimal level.142 
 
139 See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–46 
(1987) (discussing deterrence and the maximization of welfare). 
140 In other words, if a precaution would have cost more money than it 
would have saved, the inflictor should not have to pay for the resultant loss.  This 
possibility lies outside the scope of this Article. 
141 Indeed, one prominent practitioner, Richard Posner, applied this analysis 
to rape.  See Richard A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 384–85 (1992) (discussing the 
tension between moral intuition and the rational model’s allowance of rape so 
long as the rapist receives more pleasure from the action than inflicts pain on the 
victim). 
142 Writings on this point from the law and economics camp include Jennifer 
H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1114 
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Variables will complicate their assessment of a reparations 
program, but in general, the awarding of monetary reparations to 
individual victims in the form of microfinance will make sense to 
welfare analysts.  Even though reparations planners may feel 
confident that the nation has turned a corner and thus that traumas 
to citizens will not recur, a project of reparation does not supersede 
the quest of deterrence through incentives.  Even though many 
individual wrongdoers would then be out of power (or, better yet, 
dead), awarding money to victims from the government deemed 
responsible teaches prospective wrongdoers about this particular 
punch contained in a new rule of law.  Among the different ways 
to distribute pecuniary reparations, microfinance in the post-crisis 
context is particularly attractive to welfare analysts because of the 
connection between microfinance and sustainable economic 
development.143 
With the welfare effects of a reparations-through-microfinance 
scheme noted, government planners can pay heed to the 
distributive effects of this reparations policy.  Enter gender.  
Welfare analysis aggregates people into groups, and so one 
applying it may generalize about “men” and “women,” individual 
exceptions notwithstanding.  In this framework, placing value on 
the interests and experiences of women citizen-recipients is a good 
idea if it would make societies better off, but a bad one if it would 
make societies worse off.  Because this extra attention to women 
would have the effect of transferring money into women’s hands, 
 
(1993) (emphasizing that civil actions may be more likely than criminal actions to 
be prosecuted); Ronen Perry & Yehuda Adar, Wrongful Abortion: A Wrong in 
Search of a Remedy, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 507, 585 (2005) (arguing that 
“wrongful abortion” creates more deterrence than either tort or criminal liability 
can deliver, and proposing that courts make available “an extra-compensatory 
civil fine” to be divided between plaintiffs and the state).  See generally Richard 
Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1135, 1138 (2003) (arguing that whether requiring the payment of compensation 
accords with the goal of efficiency is a complex question whose answer depends 
on variables).  Another prominent economic analyst argues that mandating 
compensation to victims is more necessary in the case of intentional torts as 
compared with “ordinary” or accidental torts, so as to eliminate inefficient 
expenditures in self-protection that victims make.  See William M. Landes, Optimal 
Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 673 (1983) (“In ordinary 
torts, efficiency can be achieved without compensating the victims.  In contrast, 
efficiency usually requires compensating the victim of an intentional tort to 
prevent him from spending resources to avoid the tort.”). 
143 See generally SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 7 
(providing an illustrative list of various microfinance intuitions contributing to 
sustainable economic development). 
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the question becomes whether societies are better or worse off 
when, other things being equal, women gain control over more 
money.144 
Evidence indicates that societies will indeed be better off if they 
transfer money to women (and if they use microfinance rather than 
simple cash payments to effect this transfer) because male and 
female adults—the majority of whom in every country have 
children—provide for their children unequally.  Money in the 
hands of a woman is more likely to buy “goods that benefit 
children and enhance their capacities.”145  Around the world, men 
devote more money to pleasures for themselves—cigarettes, 
alcoholic beverages, leisure activities like sports, sexual 
conquests—than do women.  By contrast, “[s]tudies conducted on 
five continents have found that children are distinctly better off” 
when their mothers have more money to spend.146 
In Kenya, for example, the more income controlled by women 
in sugarcane farmer households, the greater the household caloric 
intake.  In Jamaica, female-headed households spend more on food 
and less on alcohol.  Data from the Ivory Coast suggest that 
doubling the proportion of income controlled by women would 
cause a 26%reduction in amounts spent on alcohol and a 14 percent 
reduction in money spent on cigarettes.  “In Brazil, $1 in the hands 
of a Brazilian woman has the same effect on child survival as $18 in 
the hands of a man.”147  In richer countries, where calorie counts 
are a less reliable proxy for well-being, one finds other indicators.  
 
144 Other welfare effects relating to reparations for women, though beyond 
the scope of this Article, warrant brief note here.  Researchers have estimated that 
violence against women cost the national economy of Nicaragua 1.6% of its GDP 
($29.5 million) in 1999, and 2% of the GDP of Chile ($1.56 billion) in 1996.  See 
Andrew R. Morrison & Maria Beatriz Orlando, Social and Economic Costs of 
Domestic Violence: Chile and Nicaragua, in TOO CLOSE TO HOME: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
IN LATIN AMERICA 51, 57, 61 (Andrew R. Morrison & Maria Loreto Biehl eds., 1999) 
(discussing the economic and social costs of domestic violence in Nicaragua and 
Chile).  To the extent that reparations payments promote stability through civic 
engagement and thereby diminish violence against women, national economies 
can look forward to becoming more prosperous.  Another example is the 
correlation between GNP and the enrollment of girls at school.  See U.N. 
Millennium Project, supra note 124, at 47 (describing how research illustrates that 
failure to invest in education for young women results lowers gross national 
product). 
145 ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT 
JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 120 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 121–22. 
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For example, affluent divorced fathers in the United States are less 
likely than their (somewhat less) affluent ex-wives to cooperate 
with paying for their children’s college education.148  Around the 
world, female legislators introduce and promote more child-
friendly government expenditures,149 suggesting a secondary 
welfare effect:  the more women can avail themselves of education 
and other sources of access to civic life, the better off children will 
be.150 
Experts on economic intervention, who have long recognized 
that development-related expenditures that benefit women yield 
payoffs to societies, share this assessment: 
This claim has now achieved “motherhood” status, in 
virtue of the accumulating evidence confirming what has 
long been available at an intuitive level, which is that 
 
148 Id. at 126. 
149 See, e.g., Id. (noting the same pattern in Scandinavia); see generally Matthew 
M. Davis & Amy P. Upston, State Legislator Gender and Other Characteristics 
Associated With Sponsorship of Child Health Bills, 4 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 295 
(2004) (reporting study of American state legislatures).  Voting rights activist 
Carrie Chapman Catt, working for suffrage in the United States, looked at several 
other countries where women had the vote in 1915 (including Australia, New 
Zealand, Norway, and Finland) to conclude that “wherever women, the 
traditional housekeepers of the world, have been given a voice in the government, 
public housekeeping has been materially improved by an increased attention to 
questions of pure food, pure water supply, sanitation, housing, public health and 
morals, child welfare and education.”  Carrie Chapman Catt, Do You Know?, 
reprinted in WOMAN SUFFRAGE: HISTORY, ARGUMENTS, AND RESULTS 138 (Frances M. 
Björkman & Annie G. Porritt eds. 1917). 
150 Some criticisms of the Crittenden thesis may be noted briefly. Crittenden 
writes that men in governments, especially American governments, dislike 
making transfer payments to mothers because they believe—correctly, it turns 
out—that money helps women abandon their unsatisfactory relationships with 
men.  See CRITTENDEN, supra note 145, at 122 (describing how money granted to 
poor women during experiments in the 1970s “reduced wives’ financial 
dependence on their husbands and increased the probability that an unhappy 
wife would pack her bags, scoop up the kids, and leave”).  Thus, it may be 
prudent to anticipate on our welfare ledger an increase in divorce and the 
severance of informal unions (although it appears equally likely that the receipt of 
reparations payments would enhance peace and stability in a household).  
Children are probably still better off.  Another possible criticism: nations could 
use excise taxes to pursue the same welfare gains that redistribution in favor of 
women would achieve.  “Sin” taxation of liquor, cigarettes, motorcycles, brothels 
and so on, and could, in theory, generate enough revenue for governments to 
enhance child welfare through public programs.  However, such an agenda 
would burden a transitional democracy trying to repair its recent failure to 
uphold the human rights of its citizens.  It is probably better to pursue welfare by 
putting money into the hands of mothers. 
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“investing in women,” especially in the areas of health and 
education, is likely to generate payoffs or “positive 
externalities” for the well-being of children, the household, 
and the economy as a whole.151 
One microcredit leader accordingly decided early in his 
banking career to take gender into account in his lending decisions, 
believing that the children of low-income parents would profit 
more from loans to their mothers.152 
Differences between microcredit and microfinance are 
pertinent to this welfare perspective.  Microcredit has won praise 
for making poor women wealthier but also blame for forcing them 
to toil in repayment efforts.  A harried woman struggling to repay 
her loan might feel compelled to draft her children into her 
struggling business.  Under this pressure, a daughter would 
probably look more valuable to her mother as a housekeeper and 
child-minder than a student continuing her education.  The form of 
microfinance proposed here—shares in a financial institution that 
carry no repayment obligation—does not generate new pressure to 
turn children into laborers.  True, it does not eliminate the 
deleterious effects on society of financial hardship, but neither does 
any other mode of reparation; and even though becoming a 
shareholder in a financial institution can disrupt a woman’s life, 
the disruptions of microfinance payments that beget no new debt 
are much gentler than the disruption of money-lending among the 
poor. 
And so the scenario of an engaged, decision-making, money-
spending, policy-directing female citizenry becomes attainable—
even likely to develop—and conducive to the good of all persons 
in the nation implementing reparations.  Wealth in the hands of 
women enhances welfare not only for children, as recipients of 
expenditures, but also for mothers, as determiners of these 
expenditures.  Developmental economics regards microfinance as 
an especially effective means to maximize the value of an initial 
investment.  Thus for purposes of enhancing welfare, the 
 
151 Kerry Rittich, Engendering Development/Marketing Equality, 67 ALB. L. REV. 
575, 580 (2003) (footnote omitted).  See also WORLD BANK, supra note 121, and 
sources cited therein (showing women’s life expectancy increased and gender 
gaps in the labor force were reduced according to the level of education women 
attained). 
152 See Bruck, supra note 60, at 62 (referring to the policies of Mohammad 
Yunus and his Grameen Bank). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1
 
2009  PECUNIARY REPARATIONS AFTER NAT’L CRISIS 51 
combination of female recipients and microfinance presents an 
exceptionally high potential yield for a reparations plan. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Standing alone, pecuniary reparations leave the effects of 
serious human rights violations unrepaired.  They do not take 
recipients back to an idyllic past where they were safe from large-
scale horrific wrongdoing.  They cannot be rendered in proportion 
to the harm suffered.  Of themselves, they provide no truth-telling, 
nor guarantees of non-recurrence, nor the kind of government and 
civil society that fend off wrongdoing before it arises. 
These infirmities of pecuniary reparations, though meaningful, 
leave intact a quality necessary to effect recognition of wrongs and 
an ambition to change current conditions:  governments and 
individuals who engage in reparation cannot deny the 
microeconomic tenet of scarcity.  The phrase “cheap talk” adverts 
to the infinite supply of words available to the disingenuous or 
distracted, who can denounce past ills with endless verbiage, never 
having to surrender anything they value enough to hold.153  A 
recipient of pecuniary reparations, by contrast, knows that the 
payer has parted with something scarce in order to affirm the truth 
of what happened to her.  This monetary acknowledgement does 
not of itself correct the wrong, but it honors her experience, 
augments her agency, holds potential to increase her security and 
her freedom, and invites her concretely, as a holder of power, into 
the emergent civil society. 
Once identified as integral to the larger reparative endeavor of 
recovering nation, pecuniary reparations ought to take the form 
that best advances the agency, recognition, security, and freedom 
of injured citizens.  This ideal form will seldom be simple transfer 
payments.  Cash is too easy for a recipient to forfeit, alienate, and 
lose.  The alternative presented in this article—establishing each 
recipient as shareholder of a financial institution—conveys money 
to her in honor of the nation’s past, where she suffered a wrong, 
and its future, which her choices and prerogatives will shape. 
 
 
153 See de Greiff, supra note 6, at 461 (explaining that without reparations, 
victims may view mere truth-telling as an empty gesture). 
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